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I. 
Point 
A liquid or artificial increment artificially produced and 
added to a natural stream or introduced into a natural channel, 
by the labor of man without intent to abandon, belongs to the 
1 
man whose labor produced it or brought it there when natural-
ly it would not have existed there. Such liquid increment 
may be taken out of the natural stream or channel by its 
owner and may be recaptured and reclaimed by him, at such 
point on the natural channel as may best serve the owner's 
purpose. Water Rights in the Western States, 3d Ed. Wiel, 
Vol. 1, p. 38. 
The copper solutions with which this case is con-
cerned are not waters within the definition about which 
have been evolved the law of waters and water rights. 
These copper solutions are not suitable for the irri-
gation of land, for they would forthwith kill instead of 
nurture vegetation of any character upon land, and in 
addition, would speedily ruin the land for any agricul-
tural use. Correlative right or reasonable use doctrines 
could have no applicability to such waters, because there 
would never be any use for them upon the lands out of 
which they might have their source. Their character 
forbids their use for culinary purposes-no human being 
could retain them upon his stomach should he succeed 
in swallowing them ; and if he could retain them they 
would kill him. The law relating to culinary waters 
therefore can have no applicability to these solutions. 
They are not suitable for other municipal uses because 
neither human flesh nor the municipal facilities could 
withstand their corrosive effect. They are not suitable 
to the generation of electric power, for they would con-
sume the very generating facilities over which they flow-
ed. Indeed, it is not as water for any of its uses 
that defendants seek them. Defendants boldly admit 
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they seek only the copper in solution in them, the liquid 
serving merely as a vehicle by which the copper from 
plaintiff's deposits would be transported to defendants' 
facilities for the latter's appropriation, and this liquid 
for plaintiff's purposes serves as the vehicle by which 
plaintiff's copper is transported over the right of way 
condemned to plaintiff's facilities for preservation and 
marketing by the latter. 
These solutions are solely the artificial product of 
plaintiff's industry, but for which they would not na-
turally exist in Dixon Gulch. They are suitable only 
for the one purpose for which plaintiff created them, 
namely, the reduction of plaintiff's low grade ore de-
posits in Dixon Gulch by the only known process per-
mitting of their reduction to plaintiff's profit, namely, 
through the process of leaching and precipitation where-
in the copper solutions represent the intermediate stage, 
the solutions in the production of which plaintiff has 
artificially employed natural laws and forces, sending 
the resulting solutions down Dixon Gulch across de-
fendants' premises over the right of way condemned 
and into plaintiff's pipe lines and thence over the 
premises of many others on their way to plaintiff's 
precipitating plant at the mouth of Bingham Canyon 
for the conclusion of the process. Any attempt to ap-
ply to this chemical so artificially produced, the law of 
su1bterranean or surface waters finds support in only 
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one common attribute, namely, that both are liquids, but 
that is a flimsy pretext upon which to erect a theory 
by which to divest from the title the one by whose 
investment, industry and expenditures the solutions were 
produced. 
In Utah Copper Co. v. Montana-Bingham Con. Mng. 
Co., 69 Utah 423, 255 Pac. 672, this court held: 
Thus, under the circumstances, we are of the 
opinion that the waters carrying copper or other 
minerals in solutions, so long as they are in the 
dump and thus a part of it, and before they leave 
it and percolate through the soil and earth on 
the claim or claims of the defendant not conveyed 
to the plaintiff, are, like the dump itself, the prop-
erty of the plaintiff: * * * Were the plain-
tiff attempting to follow, collect, and divert wa-
ters, though they carry copper in solution, after 
they have left the dump and percolating in and 
through the soil and ground of the defendant not 
conveyed to the plaintiff, the cited cases would 
be applicable, but that is not what the plaintiff 
seeks to do. It may readily be conceded that 
waters, though they carry copper or other min-
erals in solution, which are suffered and permit-
ted to flow and escape from the dump and seep 
and percolate through the soil and earth of the 
defendant's claims not conveyed to the plaintiff 
and on or in which it has no surface or other 
rights, are lost to the plaintiff and become the 
property of the defendant and may not be pur-
sued or reclaimed or taken by the plaintiff. 
That conclusion can be, and no doubt in the mind of 
the court was, supported by the fact that if such wa-
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ters or solutions were allowed to flow, seep or percolate 
in lands wherein their owner had no right or interest, 
such waters or solutions would have thereby become 
abandoned by their owner and title in the latter accord-
ingly would have ceased. The cases reviewed in that 
connection were cases of abandoned water, oil, etc., where-
in it was held that by reason of such abandonment title 
in their previous owner had ceased. The well-established 
rule stated in the subject point of this discussion is con-
fined to those cases where the owner of such liquid in-
crement had added it to the natural stream or introduced 
it into the natural channel "without intent to abandon." 
In the case at bar, for years before the Dixon Gulch 
dumps had been started, plaintiff had employed this pro-
cess in the reduction of its many low grade ore deposits 
('Tr. 374, 182 to 196, 205 to 215, 230 to 235, 241 to 246, 
659, Ex. 38) and the method commonly employed in the 
collection and diversion of the copper solutions from 
those dumps or deposits was the method described in 
Utah Copper Co. vs. Montana-Bingham Con. Mng. Co., 
and in the case at bar, namely, the collection of the solu-
tions on and above bedrock at or down the gulch below 
the toe of the dump at a point where the channel nar-
rows and bedrock is readily accessible. In the case at 
bar, there lies between plaintiff's dumps in Dixon Gulch 
and its intake on Tract C a railroad fill necessitating 
plaintiff's condemning the bottom of the gulch in its 
natural condition as a conduit for its copper solutions 
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as they pass down the gulch through the railroad fill. 
Were the railroad fill not there, plaintiff would have 
proceeded here as it had elsewhere, namely, would have 
constructed its intake in the bottom of the gulch below 
the placer gravels, where the channel was narrow and 
bedrock was readily accessible. Plaintiff cannot in the 
case at bar drive a tunnel beneath the top of bedrock 
to intercept by its raise and wings plaintiff's copper 
solutions at plaintiff's boundary, because such diverting 
structures under the circumstances there existing would 
not only be prohibitive in initial cost but would be 
imposs~ble of maintenance at any cost. (Tr. 375 to 383, 
2272 to 2277) The copper solutions from plaintiff's 
dumps above do not all sink perpendicularly to the top 
of bedrock and thence down the bottom of this precipi-
tous gulch on bedrock, but instead, while traveling gen-
erally downward, do so at all angles, the railroad fill 
over the whole of Tract D ,being saturated at times by 
the solutions as they follow their course down the gulch 
to their outlet at the so-called Hays Spring. (Tr. 320, 
323 to 338) Indeed, the so-called Hays Spring issues out 
of the railroad fill at a point six to ten feet up in the 
material of that fill. (Tr. 219, 301, 333, 1866). 
Plaintiff's intent not to abandon its copper solu-
tions has been always consistently manifest. In the 
course of the trial as part of plaintiff's proof of its title 
to the copper solutions in Dixon Gulch (Tr. 630 to 642, 
644 to 647, 690 to 691) plaintiff offered in evidence as 
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plaintiff's Exhibit 36 plaintiff's application to the State 
Engineer of the State of Utah, File No. 9990, received 
in the office of that .official June 11, 1926, seeking to 
appropriate the copper solutions to be created by the 
leaching of plaintiff's low grade ores and material then 
being and thereafter to be dumped in Dixon Gulch, the 
explanatory clause of that application being as follows: 
In the course of its mining operations in 
Bingham Oanyon in West Mountain Mining Dis-
trict in Salt Lake County, Utah, applicant will 
dump in Dixon Gulch, in Bingham Canyon, said 
mining district, county and state, a great quantity 
of overburden or low grade copper ores. The 
copper contained in such overburden or copper 
ore, after such overburden or ore shall have 
been exposed to the action of the air and meteoric 
or other waters, will become soluble in water and 
will be capable of recovery by precipitating the 
same by the aid of copper precipitants. 
It is the intention of applicant to gather 
at the point of diversion designated herein the 
waters flowing in Dixon Gulch for which this ap-
plication is made and from whatsoever source 
the same may come, including the accumulations 
in said dump of meteoric and other waters of 
which applicant may be the absolute owner, and 
after the dumping in said gulch by applicant to 
collect the copper-laden waters at said point of 
diversion after their percolation through or 
beneath said dump in boxes or sluices or 
other devices and remove the copper held therein 
in solution by precipitating the same upon scrap 
iron or other agents. It is also the intention of 
applicant to use said waters, being the waters 
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for which this application is made, in the spray-
ing and treatment of said dump for the purpose 
of leaching therefrom the copper content thereof, 
to precipitate and remove the copper and other 
valuable content from said waters and gather to-
gether the precipitates and ship and sell the same 
to smelters, reduction plants and other buyers. 
After the removal from said water of such valu-
able contents the said water will be permitted by 
applicant to flow out of applicant's said boxes, 
sluices or other containers and to waste itself be-
low such boxes, sluices or other devices, finding 
its way into Bingham Creek, at point of return 
designated herein. 
The court refused to admit that application and 
plaintiff excepted. On defendants' cross examination 
Mr. Goodrich explained that the day before, October 23, 
1928, an amendment had been filed to the application, 
Exhrbit 36, changing the point of diversion from ''near 
the lower portal of the Dixon drain tunnel to a point 
on the westerly end of Tract C as shown on Exhibit 
No.6." (Tr. 645) Mr. Goodrich testified (Tr. 638) that 
the application, Exhibit 36, "was made to preserve the 
Utah 'Copper Company's ownership in the waters in 
Dixon Gulch on the property west of the Valentine Scrip 
as against any adverse filings. We do not believe that 
the state engineer has jurisdiction over waters of this 
character, but we wanted to take every precaution as 
against some one else, to preserve the ownership to 
our own waters.'' In making the offer plaintiff's coun-
sel said in part: (Tr. 632) 
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It is an application to appropriate the wa-
ters of this stream and I would say to your 
Honor that we do not predicate our claim to title 
to these waters upon any theory that they are 
public waters or within the jurisdiction of the 
State Engineer. I am bringing out by this wit-
ness that the purpose of this application was 
simply to safeguard the plaintiff's property in 
the event the State Engineer or the Court might 
rule some day that these waters are public wa-
ters within the State Engineer's jurisdiction and 
could be appropriated. I understand the State 
Engineer in one case involving copper waters 
from these dumps has so held. * * * That 
is not our theory of plaintiff's title. In our 
opinion these waters are not public waters and 
are in no way within the jurisdiction of the State 
Engineer. 
Later on a large part of Exhibit 36 was admitted 
in evidence on defendants' offer on the theory that the 
fact that the point of diversion therein described before 
its amendment was on plaintiff's property near the 
lower portal of the railroad drain tunnel was an ad-
mission by plaintiff that all the copper solutions from 
plaintiff's dumps in Dixon Gulch would flow down and 
through the drain tunnel and out its lower portal. (Tr. 
1509 to 1515) At the time the application Exhibit No. 
36 was made, namely, .June 11, 1926, the drain tunnel 
was dry, because plaintiff's dumps in Dixon Gulch had 
been begun only the preceding January, and of course 
had not attained such magnitude as to have been able 
to supply any copper solutions to the drain tunnel. Mr. 
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Goodrich explained that his selection of that point of 
diversion had been dictated 'by his desire to describe a 
point on plaintiff's property, which he did near the 
lower portal of the railroad drain tunnel ''before some-
one else might get such an appropriation for copper 
solutions coming down Dixon Gulch so as to protect 
the Utah Copper Company in so far as I could should 
such an issue come up." ( Tr. 646) The court below 
found (Finding No. XXXII, Abs. 620) that the copper 
solutions crossing Tract D 
* * * come to and into the railroad fill from 
and through plaintiff's dumps in Dixon Gulch 
above the railroad fill, have flowed and perco-
lated down into and laterally through the rail-
road fill, have flowed down the bottom of Dixon 
Gulch on bedrock or on and through surface 
soil in the bottom of Dixon Gulch and emerged 
from the downhill slope and near the toe of the 
railroad fill in the bottom of Dixon Gulch. The 
course so pursued by said waters is definitely 
known and positively defined, said course being 
Dixon Gulch down to, through and across Tract 
D, and the whole thereof, and above bed-rock. 
The so-called Hays Spring is not a spring. 
These copper waters or solutions do not arise on 
defendants' property from subterranean sources. 
By its application Exhibit 36 and the amendment 
thereof plaintiff anticipated what to it was a remote 
contingency, namely, that its copper solutions it had 
set about to produce in Dixon Gulch might be held to be 
water flowing in a known and defined channel down 
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Dixon Gulch, public water susceptible to appropriation 
through filings made as provided by statute in the office 
of the state engineer. However remote the contingency, 
plaintiff acted, even before plaintiff had brought its 
copper solutions into existence, to fully protect against 
any attack its title in those solutions to be made. There 
would never have been any copper solutions in Dixon 
Gulch had plaintiff not created them there, all of which 
plaintiff understood when it deposited its ores there 
and when in anticipation of attack, plaintiff acquired 
title to Dixon Gulch from the westerly boundary of 
defendants' Valentine Scrip Patent on up the gulch 
over its drainage area. As plaintiff's dumps in Dixon 
Gulch progressed, plaintiff watched the copper solutions 
emanating from them, and when in March of 1928 (Tr. 
50) they had become sufficiently rich to permit of their 
profitable treatment in the pr·ecipitation f'acilities of the 
lessee Robbe, plaintiff instituted this suit to condemn 
a right of way for their conduct and collection upon 
defendants' premises, the very purpose of which was 
to prevent their abandonment, to prevent their aeqms-
ition by another upon any pretext. 
In Utah Copper Co. v. Montana-Bingham Con. Mng. 
Co., this court had held: 
* * * the waters carrying copper or other 
minerals in solution, so long as they are in the 
dump and thus a part of it, and before they leave 
it and percolate through the soil and earth on the 
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claim or claims of the defendant not conveyed 
to the plaintiff, are, like the dump itself, the 
property of the plaintiff; * * * ( 255 Pac. 
672) 
which was interpreted by the United States District 
Court for the District of Utah upon further action by 
Montana-Bingham Consolidated Mining Company to 
mean: (Respondent's Brief, pp. 68-9) 
Utah Copper Company is the owner of the 
dump or deposit here involved and all the earth, 
rock, ores, minerals, waste, water and all other 
substances therein contained, including copper 
and other minerals in solution, also the water and 
copper or other minerals in solution flowing, 
seeping or percolating therefrom, not only from 
and out of said dump but from on top of the 
surface soil or material beneath said dump and 
on bedrock beneath said surface soil or material 
beneath said dump and from within the surface 
soil and material between bedrock and the bot-
tom of said dump, and that the fact that said 
copper solutions touch, wet or saturate the top 
of said surface soil beneath said dump or seep 
into or percolate through said surface soil be-
neath said dump, or touch, wet or flow along, 
over or upon bedrock beneath said dump, neither 
has resulted nor will result in the passing from 
the defendant Utah Copper Company to the 
plaintiff Montana-Bingham Consolidated Mining 
Company of title to said waters and solutions, 
but on the contrary the defendant Utah Copper 
Company was and has eontinued, is now and 
will continue, the owner of said copper solutions 
while in the dump, while on the surface of the 
soil beneath the dump, while on bedrock beneath 
12 
the dump, and while in the soil and material be-
tween bedrock and the bottom of the dump or the 
top of the surface soil and material beneath said 
dump; and said copper solutions have been here-
tofore at all times, are now and will continue to 
be the property of the defendant Utah Copper 
'Company while on and above bedrock, until the 
same shall have flowed out and seeped and per-
colated in and through the soil of the plaintiff's 
mining claims, laterally ·beyond the periphery of 
said dump or deposit and off of and from the 
surface right, interest and estate heretofore con-
veyed to defendant * * * 
It will be remembered that the right Utah Copper 
Company had acquired in Tiewaukee Gulch was by con-
tract and it was nothing more than an easement to dump 
and remove the material deposited there, without express 
mention of copper solutions, but this court held: (255 
Pac. 674-5) 
* * * the defendant makes no claim to any of 
the ore or other material deposited on the dump; 
and, since the copper in solution is from the 
dump and from the ore and material deposited 
t.hereon and therein and not otherwise, it would 
seem that the defendant has no better claim to 
the mineral in solution, so long as it is in the 
dump, than the ore or other material in the 
dump. * * * The surface of that ground and 
upon which the dump rests was conveyed to the 
plaintiff. True, it was conveyed for dumping 
purposes, but, so long as the surface is occupied 
by the dump, it, as surface ground, is not suscep-
tible of any other use; and waters falling on and 
flowing or seeping through the dump, so long 
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as they are in the dump, do not fall on or seep 
or percolate through soil of the defendant or on 
or through any surface right owned by it but 
on a surface right and material, ore, rock, and 
earth owned by the plaintiff. * * * No wa-
ters percolating through the soil of the defend-
ant are here involved and are not sought or at-
tempted to be taken by the plaintiff. * * * 
(255 Pac. 672) 
T,he easement acquired by condemnation in the suit 
at bar was for the express purpose of conveying these 
copper solutions from plaintiff's premises across Tract 
D and into the receptacle in Tract C, yet counsel ap-
parently argue in the face of the foregoing decision 
by this court that an easement is not a sufficient interest 
in defendant's premises for this purpose, that an ease-
ment is a mere right and that notwithstanding the right 
in plaintiff to conduct its copper solutions across de-
fendants' premises that nevertheless the moment those 
solutions pass the boundary line between the two prop-
erties, title thereto vests in defendants as the owners 
of the fee. If the easement involved in Utah Copper 
Co. v. Montana-Bingham Con. Mng. Co., acquired by a 
contract silent with relation to copper solutions, was 
sufficient to preserve in Utah Oopper Company title 
thereto until those solutions had seeped or percolated 
beyond the premises on which their owner had an ease-
ment and so had become abandoned property, then of 
course, in the case at bar, where the easement acquired 
by this suit is for the express purpose of conveying 
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those copper solutions across Tract D and into the 
catchment on Tract C, the interest so acquired is ample 
to enable Utah Copper Company to preserve its title 
throughout this intermediate step in the reduction pro-
cess to which it has subjected and shall subject the ores 
it has deposited and shall deposit in Dixon Gulch for 
that purpose. Defendants' contention that a court 
order for immediate occupation for the purpose stated 
and a judgment and final order of condemnation for 
those stated purposes are nullities, 'because an easement 
is not a sufficient estate to prevent the passing to the 
owner of the fee of title to the copper solutions con-
veyed in the exercise of the right so acquired for the 
accomplishment of such stated purposes-is indeed 
illogical and astonishingly shallow. Counsel with a frank-
ness that is actual, although we can find nothing to com-
mend it, announce their intention of resorting to every 
defense of which they can conceive to compel plaintiff 
to abandon its copper solutions so that defendants may 
acquire title thereto, and their argument to that end is 
branded all over with compelling evidence of that de-
termination, an unworthy effort that is nota,ble only for 
its audacity. 
It is said m Wiel "-Water Rights in the Western 
States," 3d ed. Vol. 1, § 38, p. 40, that "the intention 
not to abandon the water turns the stream channel into 
a mere means of conveyance.'' 
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It is not our intention to cite authority at great 
length upon a rule of law as unanimously approved as 
that constituting the subject-point of this discussion. It 
is said in the note appearing in 23 L. R. A. (N. S.) at 
page 1065 that: 
It seems to be the universal rule that where 
a person by his own exertions increases the avail-
able supply of water in a stream,-that is, adds 
water to a stream which would not otherwise 
have flowed thore,-he as against other appropri-
ators has the right to appropriate and use such 
water to tho extent of the increase, whether such 
water is obtained from underground sources or 
from other water sheds. 
The Utah statue upon this subject is Sec. 9., Chapter 
72, Laws of Utah 1921, at page 189. We will refer to 
only two or three cases out of the multitude declaring 
the rule. 
Hoffman v. Stone, 7 Cal. 46, was decided in 1857, 
and it was an effort on the part of appropriators of the 
waters of a stream flowing down a ravine to enjoin 
the use of that natural channel by others as a part of 
their ditch or canal system for the conveyance of water 
derived from other sources. The appropriators contend-
ed that permitting the water of the artificial ditch to 
escape and flow down the channel of a natural stream 
was an abandonment of the ditch water, whether there 
were an intention to take the latter out below or not. 
The court held: 
there was, at the time of commence-
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ment of this suit, no natural water flowing in 
the bed of the stream, and that all the waters 
so diverted by the defendants were artificial, or 
waters conducted there by them. 
The plaintiff being the prior locators, it 
would follow that any interference with the wa-
ters of Dutch Gulch would be an infraction of 
their rights. But the appropriation of the waters 
did not give them the exclusive use of the bed 
of the stream. We see no reason why it might 
not be used by others, as a channel for conduct-
ing water, so long as it did not interfere with 
their rights. * * * 
It would be a harsh rule * * * to re-
quire those engaged in these enterprises to con-
struct an actual ditch along the whole route 
through which the waters were carried, and to 
refuse them the economy that nature occasionally 
afforded in the shape of a dry ravine, gulch, or 
canon. * * * 
In Miller v. Wheeler, 54 Wash. 429, 103 Pac. 641, 
23 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1065, the court discussed Hoffman 
v. Stone, supra, and continued: 
* * * This rule was extended in the case 
of Butte 'Canal & Ditch Co. v. Vaughn, 11 Cal. 
143, 70 Am. Dec. 769, wherein Mr. Justice ]'ield, 
who has so ably and clearly differentiated the 
law of appropriation from the rules of the com-
mon law, said: "It does not necessarily follow 
that the water introduced by the defendants be-
came subject to the use of the plaintiffs because 
its identity was lost by being mingled with the 
water naturally flowing in the creek. The rights 
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of the parties, after such mingling, are not unlike 
the rights of the owners of goods of equal value 
after their mixture,-both are entitled to take 
their given quantity." * * * 
citing many cases, including the decision of this court 
in Herriman Irr. Co. v. Butterfield Mng. & Mill. Co., 
19 Utah 453, 51 L. R. A. 930, 57 Pac. 537. 
We quote further from Miller v. W,heeler as follows: 
Ownership implies responsibility. If our 
reasoning requires further support, the fact that 
the appellants, Wheeler and Morse, because of 
the artificial augmentation of the natural flow of 
the Squillchuck, would be held liable for all dam-
age done to the lower appropriators from flood-
ing their lands, injuring the banks of the stream, 
or washing out their improvements, needs only 
to be mentioned to meet approval. * * * 
Were the copper solutions ,here involved a sub-
stance the defendants did not desire, a substance from 
which defendants could not profit, but instead one of 
which the presence might injure defendants or their 
property, how outraged the defendants would be,-how 
indignantly the defendants would charge the plaintiff 
with the nuisance and seek to subject plaintiff to the 
liability to result from having made in Dixon Gulch 
and emptied upon defendants' property solutions calcu-
lated to damage defendants. Whether or not the copper 
solutions be of value and a source of profit, might be 
calculated to arouse the cupidity of the defendants, but 
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still could not be a criterion by which to define title. 
It is said in Lewis, Eminent Domain, 3d ed., Vol. 1, 
page 153, that: 
A railroad company constructed an embank-
ment which formed a barrier to the natural flow 
of surface water and caused the same to collect 
in a ditch beside the road, in which it ran for a 
long distance and was then diseharged through a 
culvert upon the plaintiff's land, where it had 
not been accustomed to flow before. The com-
pany was held liable on the ground of its being 
a taking. And, generally, it is a taking to collect 
surface water into a channel and turn it in a 
body upon the land of another, * * * all the 
cases recognize the right of a proprietor not to be 
injured by having the water poured upon his 
land in a stream, and if this right is interfered 
with by a permanent maintenance of the works 
causing the injury, there is a taking within the 
constitution. * * * 
and again at pages 165 and 166: 
* * * One who creates or permits noxi-
ous and offensive substances upon his premises 
ought to take care that they do not escape either 
in a fluid or gaseous form into or upon his 
neighbor's land. The owner of land has a right 
not to be injured in this manner, and an inter-
ference with this right would be a taking, if done 
under the power of eminent domain. 
Likewise Tract D condemned is a natural outlet for 
waters from works for the reduction of ores or mineral 
deposits within the provision of paragraph 6 of § 7330, 
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Compiled Laws of Utah 1917. Plaintiff's precipitating 
plants are "works for the reduction of ores," and Tract 
D condemned is a ''ditch for supplying works for the 
reduction of ores with water," under the provisions of 
paragraph 5 of § 7330, Compiled Laws of Utah 1917, 
in this instance, copper water. Tract D condemned is 
also "a ditch to facilitate the reduction of ores or min-
eral deposits" within the meaning of paragraph 6 of 
§ 7330, it being a necessary link in the process neces-
sarily employed. Tract D as condemned is an ease-
ment or right of way for a ditch "or other means of 
conveying water" for the pu'blic use of mining and for 
"drainage" from plaintiff's reduction works, under the 
provisions of Sec. 4, of Ohapter 67, Laws of Utah 1919. 
Water is the name properly applied to an endless 
variety of liquids; it is not confined to pure water (H20). 
It is foolish to contend that the statutes referred to 
were intended to apply only to those waters of a certain 
chemical analysis and not to others; the statutes do not 
differentiate. It does not follow from this, however, 
that an artificially produced chemical, although liquid 
in character, is water within the contemplation of the 
law of water and water rights. The copper solutions 
with which we are here concerned are not waters in the 
latter sense 'because they have not more than one of the 
attributes of water with which the law of waters has to 
do. Their one common characteristic is their liquidity, 
wherefore by analogy their abandoment has been ruled 
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by the law of waters. We are aware of no authority 
wherein the analogy has been further pursued. 
Plaintiff's deposits in Dixon Gulch are" permanent 
works" and by them plaintiff has produced and is pro-
ducing the copper solutions about which this contro-
versy revolves. Plaintiff's production of those solutions 
by means of these "permanent works" entails, as one 
step in the process, the conveyance of that product over 
this natural channel on defendants' premises. Accord-
ingly plaintiff instituted this suit and condemned that 
right, the defendants refusing to grant the right because 
they hoped by their refusal to acquire the product for 
themselves. Plaintiff is the owner of every ingredient 
entering into the solutions and of every facility em-
ployed in their production. Defendants own nothing, 
not even the rights of way now condemned over which 
plaintiff is conducting its solutions to plaintiff's precipi-
tating plant; the stipulated purchase price for such 
rights of way condemned, the sum of $500.00, plaintiff 
has paid and taken its final order of condemnation ac-
cordingly. It would be an astonishing thing were a 
court to lend its powers to the furtherance of defend-
ants' scheme. 
And we quote further from Miller v. Wheeler, 
supra, as follows: 
* • * abandonment, like appropriation, is 
a question of intent, and to be determined with 
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reference to the conduct of the parties. The in-
tent to abandon, and an actual relinquishment, 
must concur, for courts will not lightly decree an 
abandonment of a property so valuable, as that 
of water in an irrigated region. Farnham, Wa-
ters, 691. "" "" "" The fact that the surplus is 
allowed to run into a natural water way to which 
rights of appropriation have attached is a cir-
cumstance to be considered, but does not shift the 
1burden of proving an abandonment from respon-
dents. "" "" "" 
In Ditch Co. v. Angiola Water Co., 149 Cal., 496, 
86 Pac. 1081, the court held: 
A person who is making an appropriation of 
water from a natural source or stream is not 
bound to carry it to the place of use through a 
ditch or artificial conduit, or through a ditch 
or canal cut especially for that purpose. He may 
make use of any natural or artificial channel or 
natural depression which he may find available 
and convenient for that purpose, and his ap-
propriation so made will, so far as such means of 
taking is concerned, be as effectual as if he had 
carried it through a ditch or pipe line made for 
that purpose and no other. (Syllabus.) 
It was held in Platte Valley Irr. Co. v. Buckers 
Mill. & Improv. Co., 25 Colo. 77, 53 Pac. 334, that one 
who had increased the average continuous flow of a 
stream by his own energy and expenditure was entitled 
to such increase. Plaintiff in the case at bar has not, 
as yet at least, diverted waters from other sources 
upon its dumps in Dixon Gulch, although the easement 
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hereby condemned is broad enough for that purpose, 
and of course when market conditions shall make such 
increased leaching operations profitable to plaintiff, un-
doubtedly the dumps will be sprayed with water from 
other sources. Presently, however, the "average con-
tinuous flow'' in Dixon Gulch has been increased by 
plaintiff's energy and expenditure. Mr. Earl testified: 
(Tr. 48) 
* * * A dump is just like a big sponge 
and it gathers the water as the snow melts and 
the rain falls, holds it back and distributes it 
over a longer period of time. We know from 
experience that many times gulches that were 
damaged by floods had no floods whatever after 
the dumps were placed there, but a continual 
stream of water flowed where there had been 
none before. Many of these gulches were dry 
before the dumps were there except the periods 
of runoff, and after making dumps of those 
gulches a steady stream of water flowed from 
them. 
and again (Tr. 195-6): 
* • * As to whether after the creation of 
these dumps a greater or less quantity of water 
was observed to flow from them,-as I previous-
ly stated, where there has been no continuous 
flow a continuous flow develops in those gulches, 
and where there has been a continuous flow of 
water, generally it was materially increased and 
in some cases as much as four or five times as 
much. With relation to Dixon Gulch in this re-
spect, * * * taking the years 1927 and 1928 
there has been a material increase in the flow. 
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But plaintiff by its energy and expenditure not 
only created the solutions the defendants would like to 
appropriate, but is as well the only appropriator of 
the flow! The copper in the water, not the water, is 
the thing to acquire which defendants persist, and as to 
the copper plaintiff has contributed and still contri.butes 
the whole of it to the stream flow. 
We were asked at the close of the oral argument 
if it were not necessary that we have a right in aid of 
which the law of eminent domain were invoked. In 
plaintiff's brief at pages 125 to 127, we called attention 
to the authorities to the contrary, to the effect that ''an 
action under the Eminent Domain Act cannot be con-
verted into an action to quiet title," wherefore it was 
held that in an action to condemn an easement for the 
conveyance of water for irrigation it was not an ad-
missible defense that there was no water available for 
that purpose. To similar effect was the case of State 
v. Superior Court, 20 Wash. 454, 55 Pac. 635. But in 
the case at bar there is no occasion to avoid that issue. 
Plaintiff's right in aid of which it seeks to invoke the 
law of eminent domain is plaintiff's ownership of the 
copper solutions on its own property, which solutions it 
must transport to plaintiff's precipitating plant at the 
mouth of Bingham Canyon, if plaintiff is to complete 
the reduction of its dumps or deposits in Dixon Gulch 
and save to itself the copper in the ores plaintiff has 
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transported to and deposited in Dixon Gulch for that 
purpose. 
We were then asked if we should not do something 
by way of collecting those solutions at our boundary 
before permitting them to flow across defendants' prem-
ises, by which to evidence our title in them. Plaintiff 
has done this: Plaintiff purchased the drainage area 
of Dixon Gulch down to defendants' boundary line for 
the purpose of providing a site for the deposit of its low 
grade ores and overburden where their copper content 
could be leached and saved to plaintiff. Plaintiff blasted 
ores and overburden out of plaintiff's mine where that 
material occurred in place, loaded it on cars and trans-
ported it by rail to Dixon Gulch and there deposited it 
in such broken condition not only that it might thereby 
be removed from the other phase of plaintiff's mining 
operations, but as well be subjected to the oxidizing 
agency of the air and meteoric waters whereby its cop-
per content might be leached and saved to plaintiff by the 
process herein described. Plaintiff purchased the ~ 
for, and at plaintiff's expense constructed, a precipitat-
ing plant at the mouth of Bingham Canyon in which to 
receive these and other copper solutions and precipiate 
the copper therein contained and reduce it to the form 
required for shipment and smelting. Plaintiff acquired 
rights of way for pipe lines from its several dumps 
including those in Dixon Gulch down the canyon to its 
precipitating plant, constructed pipe lines and trans-
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ported its solutions accordingly. Plaintiff instituted 
this proceeding to condemn an easement for the con-
veyance of its copper solutions from plaintiff's deposits 
in Dixon Gulch down the natural channel of the gulch 
over defendants' property to plaintiff's intake into 
plaintiff's pipe line, this upon either the theory ( 1) that 
the copper solutions were not water within the definition 
to which the law of waters applies, but were instead an 
artificial product of plaintiff's industry and expense, 
originating as such in and upon plaintiff's personal 
property and following a known and defined course and 
natural channel down Dixon Gulch to plaintiff's intake 
and thence into plaintiff's pipe lines to plaintiff's pre-
cipitating plant; or (2) that the copper solutions, al-
though not water within the contemplation of the law, 
for want of a better rule, were subject by analogy to 
certain incidents of the law of waters wherein the fact 
that both are liquid constitutes their only common at-
tribute. And lest it might be held that because the cop-
per solutions would flow down the natural channel of 
Dixon Gulch, in that known and defined course, such 
solutions would be subject to appropriation as water so 
flowing initiated by filing in the office of the State 
Engineer as provided by statute, plaintiff made such 
a filing in the office of the State Engineer (Ex. 36) 
at the time plaintiff began its deposits there and before 
there were any copper solutions, plaintiff knowing then 
that the solutions would be formed and that they would 
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flow down the gulch just as experience has proved. 
One would conclude the plaintiff had done a great 
deal, but notwithstanding all that, the thought seemed 
to be that plaintiff should have constructed a concrete 
dam or some such structure across Dixon Gulch along 
plaintiff's boundary line and there the solutions have 
been collected and allowed to spill over such impediment 
and flow on down the natural channel which under those 
conditions would have been susceptible to condemnation, 
the fact of its being a natural channel instead of an 
artificial channel being of no importance under the 
statute. The case would then be squarely within the 
decision of this court in Utah Copper Co. v. Montana-
Bingham Con. Mng. Co. In the first place, as we have 
already noted, the construction of such a dam must of 
necessity extend not only across Dixon Gulch but up 
through the railroad fill to its very surface, because 
the copper solutions in their course down the gulch 
flow, seep and percolate laterally through the dump 
and railroad fill, and the railroad fill at that point at-
tains a depth from surface to the bottom of the gulch 
of 108 feet. (See photostat inserted at page 32). Not 
only would the initial cost of such a structure be pro-
hibitive, but it would be utterly incapable of main-
tenance at any cost. The dumps and railroad fill are 
masses of loose material. A concrete dam was found 
necessary at the toe of the railroad fill long before 
the dumps were made above in order, temporarily at 
27 
least, to hold back the fill material and prevent its 
working on down that precipitous gulch. As explained 
by Mr. Goodrich and Mr. Earl, such a diversion facility 
in that material could not long exist because the pres-
sure lateraly imposed would soon warp, twist, distort 
and crush it. Moreover, the plaintiff had no such right 
in or through the railroad fill, nor could such right be 
condemned, endangering as it obviously would the stabil-
ity of the fill and creating an impediment to the con-
duct of the railroad operation generally. And what a 
useless thing to do ! 
And the question was asked if an irrigator would 
have a similar right, the illustration being that A was 
the owner of a tract of land in which true percolating 
waters had their source; that immediately below A's 
tract was another owned by B into which the percolat-
ing waters from A's land seeped naturally forming a 
bog upon a part of B 's tract, from which B was en-
gaged in the pumping of the water so collected there up 
to and upon B 's higher land for the irrigation of the 
latter; that lying immediately below B 's tract was an-
other owned by A, and that A conceived the plan of 
condemning an easement across B 's tract in its natural 
state for the conveyance of the percolating water so 
originating in A's upper tract. The question was, would 
A have the right to condemn such an easement across 
B 's land for that purpose? If the plaintiff's copper 
solutions are to be defined as true percolating water, 
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the question was a fair one, and the same rule should 
be applied to all persons regardless of the use to which 
such true percolating waters are to be applied. 
Of course A would have the right to construct a 
dam along his boundary, collect on A's property the per-
colating waters so impounded, and then condemn a ditch 
across B 's tract for the conveyance of the waters so 
collected for the irrigation of A's lower tract. Whether 
or not as an incident to A's appropriation the bog 
upon B 's tract was dried up, B 's pumps were put out 
of commission and B 's tract rendered worthless, would 
be damnum absque in juria, would be an incident of no 
interest to anyone because B had no right to the con-
tinued percolation of the percolating water making in 
A's land. The question assumes that all the water 
in the bog on B 's tract had its origin in A's upper tract 
as true percolating water; that neither reasonable use 
nor correlative right doctrines applied and that there 
was no known or defined channel, and that there would 
be no issue raised as to the necessity under such cir-
cumstances of condemning an area of unreasonable ex-
tent, then we are aware of no reason under those facts 
why A might not condemn an easement across B 's tract 
for the conveyance of percolating waters originating in 
A's upper tract for the irrigation of A's lower tract. 
The decisions of this court and of all others, whatever 
may be the language used, are to the effect that perco-
lating water arising upon A's premises is A's property. 
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It is not necessary that A do anything to make such 
true percolating water his property while upon his prem-
Ises. See Kinney on Irrigation and Water Rights, 2d 
od., Vol. 2, § 1189, p. 2153, as follows: 
The English rule is that all percolating wa-
ters are considered a part of the soil where 
found, and, therefore belong absolutely to the 
owner thereof. * * * This rule of the com-
mon law as to all percolating waters was gen-
erally adopted by the various States and Terri-
tories of this country, both East and West; * * * 
And in all jurisdictions, at the present time, 
what are considered mere diffused percolations 
come within the common law rule as stated above. 
Even the Western States which distinguish those 
percolating waters which are the source of sup-
ply to other waters, from diffused percolations, 
apply the common law rule to diffused percola-
tions and that, too, since the modern classifica-
tion was made, which originated with the case 
of Katz v. Walkinshaw. 
and such is the clearly announced rule in this jurisdic-
tion. See for instance Willow Creek Irr. Co. v. Michael-
son, 21 Utah 248, 60 Pac. 943, 51 L. R. A. 280, 81 Am. 
St. Rep. 687, wherein this court held: 
Water intermingling with the ground, or 
flowing through it by filtration or percolation, 
or by chemical attraction, is but a component 
part of the earth, and has no characteristic of 
ownership distinct from the land itself. In the 
eye of the law, water so commingled and flowing, 
or motionless, underneath the surface, is not the 
subject of ownership apart and distinct from the 
soil. 
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Should A permit such water to leave his estate 
he would lose title to it, but, as in the case at bar, such 
water would never leave his estate if he first condemned 
an easement for the conveyance of it, and under the 
statutes of this state whether the easement be for a 
facility that is natural or artificial is of no importance. 
This court of course correctly held in Utah Copper Co. 
v. Montana-Bingham Con. Mng. Co. that an easement 
for the removal of a dump by implication included the 
removal of the copper solutions made by the process 
now familiar to us, and the fact that those solutions 
seeped through the dump and into the natural soil be-
neath on down to bedrock and thence down the gulch 
through the natural soil and on bedrock beneath the 
dump, as well as through the dump itself, on an ease-
ment for the removal of the dump, did not divest Utah 
Copper Company from its title to such solutions. Such 
was the opinion also of the District Court of the United 
States for the District of Utah. A specific easement 
condemned in the case at bar must accomplish the same 
purpose. As aptly said in Simmons v. Winters, 21 
Ore. 35, 28 Am. St. Rep. 727, 27 Pac. 7: 
As there must be an actual diversion of the 
water from its natural channel by means of a 
ditch or other structure to effect the appropri-
ation, any dry ravine, gulch, or hollow in lands 
may be used for this purpose as a part of the 
ditch for conducting the water. Not only may 
these be used by the appropriator as a parr 
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of his ditch, but he may use the lower portion 
of the same bed or natural channel from which 
the water is taken. Porn. Rip. Rights, § 48. * * * 
The maxim of the law is that whoever grants 
a thing is supposed also, tacitly, to grant that 
without which the grant would be of no avail. 
Where the principal thing is granted, the inci-
dent shall pass. Oo. Litt. 152a. A grant of real 
estate will include whatever the grantor has 
power to convey which is reasonably necessary 
to the enjoyment of the thing granted. 3 Washb. 
Real Prop. *627. * * * 
A contrary ruling would be too monstrous and 
absurd to be sanctioned by judicial authority. 
II 
Point 
The so-called Hays Spring is not upon or within the 
property or estate of the defendants, but issues from and 
out of the railway fill which is the property and estate of 
the Bingham & Garfield Railway Company, and of which 
at the time of their issuance those solutions are a part, what-
ever the course they may have pursued to their point of issu-
ance. For that reason, if for no other, defendants neither 
have now nor ever have had any right, title or interest in 
or to the waters of the so-called Hays Spring. 
Immediately adjoining the mining claims of the 
plaintiff in Dixon Gulch to the east is Valentine Scrip 
owned by the defendant Stephen Hays Estate, Inc. 
(Finding of Fact VII, Abs. 600). The Bingham & Gar-
field Railway fill is for the most part on the property 
of plaintiff (Exhibit 12 and VI, photo Exhibit 19 in-
serted in Respondent's Brief, p. 12). We will here 
insert a drawing prepared from Exhibit VI which ac-
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curately delineates Tracts B, C and D, the easterly 
boundary line of plaintiff's property across Dixon 
Gulch, which is the westerly boundary of the defend-
ants' Valentine Scrip, and supplies other information, 
including certain dimensions and distances for which 
we were asked during the oral argument but were unable 
to ,supply with precision. The Railway Company's in-
terest in and upon Tract D is that of an easement for 
railroad purposes, more particularly defined by Ex-
hibits 4 and 5 and Findings of Fact Nos. VIII and X 
and illustrated upon Exhibit VI. Pursuant to those 
easements the Bingham & Garfield Railway Company 
dumped or caused to be dumped into Dixon Gulch, par-
tially upon Tract D, 175;644 cubic yards of material 
(Tr. 654, Ex. 39) whereby to construct the fill over 
which the Railway Company's equipment is operated 
across Dixon Gulch. Of that material, in all 175,644 
cubic yards, 46,924 cubic yards of quartzite was obtain-
ed from the adjoining cut on the north side of Dixon 
Gulch, and 128,720 cubic yards of porphyry rock or low 
grade copper ore or overburden was obtained from the 
plaintiff's mine, the latter material being generally of 
the same character as that constituting plaintiff's dumps 
in Dixon Gulch westerly of the railroad fill. (Tr. 655) 
Exhibit VI supplies the following detail concerning the 
railway fill in Dixon Gulch: 
Total area covered by filL___ _ ____________________ 3.21 acres 
Total area on Valentine Scrip _________________ 1.43 acres 
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Total area on plaintiff's property ........... 1.78 acres 
Total quantity of material 
deposted ................................................. 175,644 cu. yds. 
Quantity of material on Valentine 
Scrip ......................................... 58i360 cu. yds. or 1/3 
Two-thirds of the railroad fill rests upon the Argonaut 
No. 1 Placer Mining Claim, U. S. Lot No. 302, of which 
plaintiff is the owner, as will more particularly appear 
from the certified copy of conveyance to plaintiff intro-
duced in evidence as Exhibit 12. 
By instrument dated April 30, 1928, (Exhibit 11) 
Bingham & Garfield Railway Company gave its consent 
that Utah Copper Company might-
* * * enter upon said premises and use 
as a conduit for the conveyance of water and cop-
per and any and all other solutions and minerals 
any part or the whole, of said premises. And 
Railway Company does hereby consent, in so far 
as any rights or easement owned or possessed by 
it over, upon, in, beneath or through the said 
premises are concerned, that Copper Company 
may enter upon and do or cause to be done any 
and all acts and things that will not at any time 
interfere with the proper use and enjoyment of 
said premises by Railway Company. 
Defendants have asserted in their brief that the 
court below concluded that the railway fill was a part 
of the realty upon which it was situated, and hence was 
the property of the defendants. Were the defendants 
correct in that contention, no more than one-third of 
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the railway fill could attach to their property, because 
the remaining two-thirds lies upon plaintiff's property. 
But the court below did not so conclude. After finding 
the facts with relation to the acquisition of the Railway 
Company's easements and the construction of the fill 
for the operation of the Railway Company's facilities 
across Dixon Gulch (Findings of Fact No. VIII and X, 
.AJbs. 601, 602) the court concluded as follows ('Conclus-
IOn of Law IV, Abs. 626): 
Bingham & Garfield Railway Company was 
at all times with which this cause is concerned 
and now is the owner of said railroad fill in the 
sense that said Railway Company may remove 
the fill or a part of it if its removal be in further-
ance of its railway operations and pursuant to 
and within the limits of the order of condemna-
tion and conveyances by which the Railway Com-
pany's right of occupation is defined. But the 
Railway Company does not retain title to the fill 
in the sense that it has all of the incidents of title 
thereto and the Railway Company does not have 
the right to capture vagrant waters therein. 
The court neither found nor concluded as stated on 
page 48 of Appellants' Reply Brief that "the fill to 
belong to defendants so far as the right to capture the 
water thereon is concerned.'' On the contrary, the 
court both found and concluded that the defendant had 
no right at all to capture the copper solutions or waters 
with which this case is concerned. The easements in 
the Railway Company are not broad enough to include 
the conveyance of copper solutions from plaintiff's 
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dumps above into plaintiff's intake on Tract C to ac-
complish the leaching and precipitation of plaintiff's 
ores. Wherefore plaintiff ins,tituted this suit to ac-
quire that easement by condemnation. The Railway 
Company was not a party to this suit. We presume no 
one would contend that the Railway Company's build-
ings, tracks, rails and ties could not be removed by 
the Railway Company at its pleasure, and no more 
could the Railway Company be deprived of the right to 
remove the railway fill if for any reason its removal 
were desired by the Railway Company. 
Counsel made the same contention in the court below 
and in support thereof cited two cases that hold direct-
ly against them, and those cases are sufficient for our 
purpose here. We refer to-
Van Husan v. Omaha Bridge & Terminal Ry. 
Co., 118 Ia. 366, 92 N. W. 47. 
Omaha Bridge & Terminal Ry. Co. v. Whit-
ney 68 Nebr. 389, 99 N. W. 525. 
Omaha Bridge & Terminal Ry. Co. v. Whitney, 68 
Nebr. 389, 99 N. W. 525, was a suit to condemn for a 
railroad right of way certain lands upon which had 
theretofore been constructed an embankment of earth 
for a roadbed, and ties and tracks had been laid over 
it, thus making a completed railroad track. The road-
bed had been constructed years before by the Union 
Pacific Railway Company under an agreement with a 
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land company for the purpose of furnishing trackage 
facilities in that vicini,ty. In the condemnation suit 
the question was as to the ownership of the roadbed 
theretofore constructed by the Union Pacific Railway 
Company and as to whether or not the condemner should 
be required to pay the value of the land sought to be 
condemned as enhanced by the railroad construction 
already there. It was contended by the defendants that 
the Union Pacific Railway Company had conveyed to 
the defendants' grantor not only the land upon which 
the enbankment and roadbed had been constructed, but 
the roadbed as well, and that the condemner accordingly 
must pay for the property taken, which included the 
roadbed, and the court held that :by reason of that con-
veyance by the Railway Company to the defendant the 
latter had :become the owner of the roadbed or fill, con-
tinuing in part as follows: 
* * * The rule, no doubt, is that a rail-
road company, when it enters upon the land of 
another, constructs a roadbed, and places its 
ties and rails thereon, and occupied the land for 
right of way purposes, has created property 
which would inure to the benefit of and belong 
to the company thus constructing it, or to its 
grantees, and a landowner could not, in condem-
nation proceedings, have the value of such work 
and improvement included in his award. 
And in Van Husan v. Omaha Bridge & T. Ry. Co., 
118 Ia. 366, 92 N. W. 47, the court held: 
There is no doubt of the general rule, re-
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lied upon by appellee, that one may erect im-
provements on the land of another which do not 
become a part of the real estate; and, were it 
not for the deed made by the Union Pacific Com-
pany, we would be inclined to agree with them 
in their conclusion that this embankment belong-
ed to the Union Pacific Company, or its grantees, 
and that plaintiffs are not entitled to compensa-
tion therefor; but in the face of this solemn in-
strument it does not lie in the mouth of that 
company or its grantees to say that it had no 
title to the lands, and, therefore, that the im-
provements thereon did not pass by the deed. 
When a railroad company enters upon the land of 
another, builds a roadbed, places ties and rails 
thereon, they, as a general rule, in the absence 
of abandonment to the owner, belong to the com-
party constructing the same, or to its grantees or 
assignees, and the landowner cannot, in condem-
nation proceedings, have the value thereof in-
cluded in his award. This is famil,iar doctrine 
requiring no support from the authoritives. 
* * *Doubtless, as between the Union Pacific 
Company and Street and the Nebraska Ferry 
Company, the embankment, and especially the 
ties and rails, was, before the execution of the 
deed, personal property, and might be said to be 
a trade fixture, under the doctrine announced in 
Railroad Co. v. Nyce, 61 Kan. 394, 59 Pac. 1040, 
48 L. R. A. 241, and Justice v. Railroad Co., 87 
Pa. 28. * * * 
With relation to the two cases cited in the above 
quotation, in that of Railroad Co. v. Nyce will be found 
the following in paragraph 4 of the syllabus: 
4. Improvements placed upon real estate 
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by a railroad company, necessary to the oper-
ation of the road, are to be regarded as trade 
fixtures, and not accessories of the land to which 
they are attached. 
The second of the two cases so cited, that of Jus-
tice v. Railroad Co., 87 Pa. St. Rep. 28, was decided 
in the year 1878 and clearly enough announces the rule 
for which plaintiff contends in the case at bar. That 
case had to do with the railroad company that con-
structed a part of its road as a trespasser upon lands 
wherein it had no title or interest of any kind. The 
court held that the owner of the fee did not thereby 
become the owner of the railroad facilities, saying in 
part: 
* * * A railroad company can take no 
free-hold title, and when its proper use of the 
easement ceases, the franchise is at an end. 
There is no intention in fact to attach the struc-
ture to the freehold. We have therefore these 
salient features to characterize the case before 
us, to wit: the right to enter on the land under 
authority of law, to build a railroad for public 
use; the acquisition thereby of a mere easement 
in the land; the entire absence of an intention to 
dedicate the chattels entering into its construc-
tion to the use of the land; the necessity for their 
use in the execution of the public purpose; and, 
lastly, the power to retain and possess these chat-
tels and the structures they compose, by a valid 
proceeding at law, nothwithstanding the original 
illegality of the entry. * * * 
There are some analogies bearing remotely 
on the question before us, showing that property 
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is not gained by the owner of land because found 
upon it. Thus, in the case of property carried 
off by a flood and stranded on the premises 
·of another, the owner may follow it, enter and 
take it, or if the owner of the land convert it may 
recover its value: * * * 
The court below was aware of the foregoing decis-
ions when making its conclusion of law No. IV herein-
before set out in full, and instead of concluding that the 
defendants were the owners of that part of the railway 
fill that is upon lands whereof the defendants are the 
owners in fee subject to the railway easements, finds 
that the Railway Company "was at all times with which 
this case is concerned and now is the owner of the rail-
road fill in the sense that the Railway Company may 
remove the fill or a part of it, etc.'' While we do not 
approve of any limitations whatever upon the Rail-
way Company's title to its fill, and deny that there is 
any authority whatever by which a limitation could be 
imposed under the facts of this case wherein no inten-
tion to abandon appears, we did not assign error in 
the face of a judgment and final order in all respects 
in our favor. Had we assigned error upon the court's 
refusal to admit the water application, Exhibit 36, and 
as well upon all other rulings to which we excepted, we 
would have become a burden to the court rather than 
of the assistance we have the presumption to hope we 
are rendering. 
Conclusion of Law No. IV IS to the .effect that the 
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Railway Company is the owner of the fill and has the 
right to remove it, hence under thl:l rule announced by 
Utah Copper Co. v. Montana-Bingham Con. Mng. Oo.,-
* * * the waters carrying copper or other-
minerals in solution, so long as they are in the 
dump and thus a part of it, and before they leave 
it and percolate through the soil and earth on 
the claim or claims of the defendant not convey-
ed to the plaintiff, are, like the dump itself, the 
property of the plaintiff; * * * (255 Pac. 
672) 
Every drop of water taken into plaintiff's intake 
from the so-called Hays Spring came and now comes 
to the surface out of the railroad fill. (Tr. 219, 301, 
333, 1866) At plaintiff's intake all the material on and 
wbove bedrock was from, and constitutes a part of the 
railroad fill. Upon this subject Mr. Earl testified as 
follows: 
* * * In the driving of the tunnel there 
was no water encountered. After the raise was 
made up to the railroad fill some water went 
down into the tunnel. The tunnel was dry during 
the entire period of time that we were excavating 
until we raised. * * * It was dry ground. It 
was dusty when they drilled it; * • * Wben 
we raised and went up to the surface we got 
quite a little water. Wben I went up in the morn-
ing, the night shift had broken through the solid 
rock and when I went up there in the morning, 
about half past seven in the morning (Tr. 105) 
there was a little water dripping down and at 
that time they were excavating up into-under-
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neath the concrete walls, about 2 or 3 feet above 
bedrock. * * * They encountered water above 
bedrock. It percolated through the fill or soil, 
whatever you want to call it; it is part of the 
railroad fill. Everything above bedrock right in 
the bottom of that gulch was railroad fill, every 
bit of it. * * * 
Mr. Earl located the Hays Spring as follows: 
* * * I think I have already indicated it 
on exhibit 6 as being about the point where the 
figure 4 appears on that course N. 41 degrees 38 
minutes west, 38 feet. The water at that point 
comes out through the boulders of the rock wall 
that is constructed there, that is a part of the fill. 
With relation to the original bottom of Dixon 
Gulch, that point is a little bit to the left, I 
would say, the left hand side of it, 8 or 10 feet 
and maybe 12 feet, higher elevation. It is prob-
ably-! wouldn't say positively, (Tr. 204) be-
cause I have not staked out the bottom of that 
gulch, but I think it is about 15 feet to the left 
of the original bottom of the gulch. 
* * * 
* * * The fill at that point is seven to ten 
feet deep. * * * 
The defendants' geologist, Mr. Crane, admitted 
that (Tr. 1866) the point of issuance of the Hays Spring 
was from and out of the railroad fill. See also the testi-
mony of Mr. Goodrich (Tr. 301) as follows: 
* * * The water comes to the surface 
from a point marked '' Q'' in pencil in the bot-
tom of the Dixon Gulch, just below the rock wall 
shown on Exhibit 9. The water does not come 
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out on bedrock at that point; it comes out of the 
rock and other material in the bottom of Dixon 
Gulch. That rock and material at that point is 
six or eight feet deep above bedrock. The water 
at that point comes out on top of that rock and 
material and not on bedrock. This material is 
not natural surface soil, the most of it has wash-
ed down from the railroad embankment; a part 
of the railroad fill. 
* * * • 
* * * The spring that comes out below 
the rock wall that we have been talking about in 
the bottom of the gulch comes out on top of ma-
terial in the bottom of the gulch, coming out 
of the railroad fill. It does not come out of the 
side of the hill. * • • 
The railroad fill was constructed by the Bingham 
& Garfield Railway Company for use in the operation 
of its railroad; it is one of its facilities for that purpose. 
This fill, constructed there pursuant to easements grant-
ed for that purpose, of course is and will until albandon-
ed remain the property of the railway company. Pur-
suing defendants' theory, the copper solutions existing 
in or percolating or flowing through or upon the fill, 
would be a part of the fill, and like the fill itself, would 
be the property of the railway company. As iboth the 
trial court and the supreme court held in the case of 
Utah Copper Company v. Montana-Bingham Consoli-
dated Mining Company, supra, whatever the earlier 
course taken by those solutions, so long as they are 
within the railroad fill, defendants can have no interest 
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m them. Applying the law of percolating and surface 
waters for which defendants so strongly contend, those 
copper solutions on that theory would be a part of the 
railway company's estate, and when they left defend-
ants' estate (if they were ever upon it) title vested in 
the railway company, and their present disposition would 
be a matter 'between the railway company and the plain-
tiff wherein the defendants could be in no manner 
concerned. 
The fact that the Railway Company's easements 
gave the Railway Company no power to conduct cop-
per solutions from plaintiff's dumps over and across 
Tract D for purposes of precipitation did not on that 
account vest in the owner of the fee title to the copper ' 
solutions that were in fact within the Railway Com-
pany's property, the railway fill. Had the Railway 
Company collected those solutions in vats or tanks on 
Tract D for the purpose of precipitating the copper from 
them, it would have exceeded the privileges embraced 
within its easements, but the copper solutions in its facil-
ities would not have become the property of the owner of 
the fee. It could not be denied that had the copper solu-
tions endangered the stability of the fill, the Railway 
Company would have had the right within its easements 
and without consulting the defendants to have collected 
and disposed of the copper solutions in its fill or have ar-
ranged with another for their collection and disposition 
for the protection of the fill, and that therein the defend-
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ants would have had neither right nor interest. It was con-
tended in Utah Copper Co. v. Montana-Bingham Con. 
Mng. Co. that the dumping easement in Tiewaukee 
Gulch was not broad enough to give the owner of the 
dump the right to collect and dispose of the copper solu-
tions making there, and that therefore the meteoric 
waters flowing upon and collecting in the dump were 
the property of the defendant owner of the fee, their 
collection and disposition by the owner of the dump not 
having been embraced within the grant by which the 
easement was created, but this court held, as we have 
already observed, that although the copper solutions or 
waters were not mentioned in the grant, still, owner-
ship of the dumps was ownership of all within them, 
and that the copper solutions while in the dumps were 
a part of the dumps and the property of the Utah Cop-
per Company, which owned the dumps. The Hays 
Spring, so-called emerges from and out of the railroad 
fill by whatever course or courses the solutions arrived 
at that destination, and title to such solutions while in 
the fill could not be in the defendants. By its consent 
the Railway Company surrendered to the plaintiff what-
ever claim or interest it had in or to those solutions. 
They were not the property of the defendants. 
Counsel take exception to our statement that the 
occupation by the Bingham & Garfield Railway Com-
pany of the area across Dixon Gulch covered by its 
easements is exclusive, and challenged us to cite any 
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authority to that effect. We accordingly take this oc-
casion to direct counsel's attention to the case of Hop-
kins v. Chicago, St. P., M. & 0. Ry. Co., 76 Minn. 70, 
78 N. W. 969, wherein the court held: 
* * * Our view of the law is that * * * 
whatever may be the particular railroad purpose 
giving rise to this necessity,-whether for right 
of way, depot grounds, railroad yards, sites for 
machine shops, elevators, etc., or for planting 
trees or erecting screens to protect the road from 
snow,-the railroad company is entitled to the ex-
clusive possession of the land, unless otherwise 
expressly provided in the order of the court, so 
long as it sees fit to use it for the purposes for 
which it was acquired; that it is for the railroad 
company, and it alone, to determine when it deems 
it necessary or proper to use the land for such 
purposes, and when it takes possession the burden 
is not on it to show that the manner of the use 
is necessary. We fail to percieve any distinction 
in principle in this respect between land acquired 
for protection against snow, and land acquired 
for right of way, or any of the other of the 
numerous purposes for which railroad companies 
may condemn. There are manifest reasons, found-
ed on public policy and necessity, why the pos-
session of land acquired for railroad purposes 
should ordinarily be exclusively in the company, 
and not concurrently in it and the former owner. 
* * * 
and to Olive v. Sabine & E. T. Ry. Co., 11 Tex. Civ. App. 
208, 33 S. W. 139, wherein the court said: 
* * * a conflict of opinion has arisen 
among the courts as to the correlative rights of 
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the owner of the fee and the owner of the right, 
-some holding, as matter of law, that the nature 
of the use of the right of way, essential in the 
operation of a railway, is such as to necessitate 
the entire possession and control of the soil, bur-
dened with the right, and to exclude the owner 
of the fee from any concurrent use or enjoyment 
of it whatever; and others holding that, while the 
right of the company is the paramount one, and 
the owner cannot impede its full exercise, or put 
the land to uses inconsistent with its full exercise, 
still it is not of such a nature as to prevent the 
use of the land by the owner for any purpose at 
all. * * * 
and then observe the ruling of this court in Bingham 
& Garfield Ry. Co. v. North Utah Mining Co., 49 Utah 
125, 162 Pac. 65, wherein this court held that-( quoting 
paragraph 1 of the syllabus) 
The use of land condemned for a railroad 
right of way for an exclusive use permanent in 
its nature precludes the owner from entering 
on or using any part of it, except by the con-
demnor's consent, or where the statute or the 
court limits the easement by reserving certain 
rights to the owner. 
The language in the judgment and final order of 
condemnation (Exhibit 5) is that the plaintiff railway 
company ''may exclusively occupy said premises.'' The 
deed (Exhibit 4) defines the grant in a manner to per-
mit of no other conclusion under the authorities than 
that the railway company's occupation is exclusive. 
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III 
Point 
By chemical analysis the copper solutions from the Bing-
ham & Garfield Railway drain tunnel, the Bingham & Gar-
field Railway fill (Hays Spring) and the North or Copper In-
cline were shown to have a common source in plaintiff's 
dumps above in Dixon Gulch. 
Respondent's function is to reply to appellants' 
case on this appeal. Appellants' effort to discredit 
:B-,indings of Fact Nos. XXVIII to XXXV, both inclus-
ive, (Abs. 619 to 624) relating to the source of the cop-
per solutions with which we are here concerned and the 
channel or course over which they flow, seep and perco-
late, has been so feeble, ever coupled with an apologetic 
statement that it made no differnce anyway from whence 
the solutions came or by what channel or course they 
arrived, and coupled further with a refusal to discuss 
the geologic case, that our argument upon those mat-
ters has been cursory merely because appellants' case 
did not justify a more extended discussion. According-
ly the very important testimony of Beeson, Hanson, 
Marsh and Martin has been barely referred to and their 
several carefully performed experiments and graph ex-
hibits to prove the source of these copper solutions have 
been dwelt upon scarcely at all. We are confident that 
the formal findings of a trial court are not to be set 
aside 'bY the mere assertion that they are not supported 
by the evidence and, of course, not to be set aside by 
the mere statement that they are of no importance any 
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way beoause by law appeUants' have succeeeded to the 
ownership of the copper solutions whatever their origin 
may have. been or by whatever course they may have ar-
rived at their present destination. Because mentioned 
so seldom counsel have the effrontery to state to this 
court "that plaintif was none too proud of the evidence 
of one of its so-called experts-Mr. Frederick D. Han-
son." (Reply Brief for Appellants, p. 44.) We hope 
this court will read the whole of Mr. Hanson's testi-
mony. Plaintiff offered no expert in whose testimony 
it takes a greater pride than that of Mr. Hanson, nor 
for whose ability ,and integrity plaintiff has a greater 
respect. None of plaintiff's witnesses, either expert or 
lay, were "bought or paid for." They were not the type 
of men who could have been bought or paid for. We 
are surprised that the testimony of the defendants' 
witness Mr. Shelton was even mentioned by defendants' 
counsel. That kind ·of talk may be argument in the 
opinion of counsel, but it is not within our definition 
of it and merits little comment. 
While we were astonished at the testimony of some 
of defendants' witnesses, it remained for counsel to ex-
plain that its experts had been "bought and paid for" 
(Reply Brief for Appellants, p. 38). Counsel are 
capable of frank admissioll!s. We have characterized 
them as "audacious," but this is the first occasion 
we have had to witness an admission in the briefs 
of counsel that they had offered and vouched for 
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the testimony of witnesses whom they had "bought 
and paid for." Plaintiff's witnesses were not bought or 
paid for. Expert witnesses are not always dishonest. 
Plaintiff offered its experts and vouched for their in-
tegrity and intellectual honesty. Both are best disclosed 
by their testimony. Plaintiff invites comparisons upon 
that basis. 
With accustomed abandon counsel devote about half 
a paragraph, on page 53 of the Reply Brief for Appel-
lants, to the statement that by chemical analysis the 
copper solutions at the Hays Spring (Bingham & Gar-
field Railway fill), the drain tunnel and the north or 
copper incline were proved to have come from different 
sources. If true, that fact would be worthy of elabor-
ation and development. Of course the statement is not 
true and the court's findings upon that subject (Find-
ings of Fact XXXI and XXXIII, Abs. 620, 621) are 
abundantly supported by the evidence. 
Harold S. Martin was a metallurgical engineer m 
plaintiff's employ and as such in charge of plaintiff's 
research and analytical laboratories and of plain tiff's 
experimental and research work on flotation and ore 
tracing, including processes employed in the leaching of 
plaintiff's dumps and the production and treatment of 
the copper solutions so obtained. Mr. Martin described 
in detail the leaching processes as applied to plaintiff's 
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dumps, the time element involved, etc. (Tr. 470, et seq), 
and upon being recalled (Tr. 1988 et seq) testified to 
his study of water analyses by Messrs. Black & Deason, 
Herman Harms and Dr. Thomas B. Brighton, which 
analyses were made of water samples taken by vanous 
persons over a period of several months. 
Mr. Martin reduced the analyses to graphic form 
by his Chart, Plaintiff's Ex. 77, platting upon that 
exhibit the results of the several analyses in the same 
manner as those analyses were reported by the chemists 
making them, i. e., in milligrams per liter (Tr. 1990). 
Defendants illustrated the result·s of these analyses, 
or certain of them, by graphs prepared on a different 
basis in order to magnify slight differences m umm-
portant details (Exhibits 68 and 125). Mr. Martin's 
testimony upon his chart, Exhibit 77, his comparisons 
and conclusion, will ·be found in the transcript from 
page 1988 to 2022. He testified in part as follows: 
From my study of these analyses, as to 
whether or not these waters came from the same 
·source or had traveled substantially the same 
channel,-! would say from these analyses that 
the first three waters, (Tr. 1995) the B. & G. 
drain tunnel water, the B. & G. fill water and 
the north incline water must have come either 
from the same or very simi1ar sources because 
they contain all of these elements in substantially 
the same amount. 
As to each determination, and the variations 
in each and how they reflect upon the identity 
51 
of these waters- * * * The difference in 
the analyses by the different chemists are as 
great and in some c1ases greater than the differ-
ence in the water samples by the same chemists. 
(Tr. 1996) * * * So that I do not consider 
these vari,ations in the position of solids in the 
three wa,ters or in the sepaDate samples of the 
three waters as indicative of a different origin. 
* * * The copper determinations by the dif-
ferent chemists on different samples check al-
most exactly; that is an easy and accurate de-
termination, so that there is not any argument 
about the copper content showing any different 
'SOurce. 
The free ~sulphuric acid shows a wide vari-
ation between Mr. Harms and Dr. Brighton as 
against Black & Deason's results. I think that 
although Black & Deason's report indicates that 
their determination was free acid, that it actually 
was not free sulphuric acid, but total sulphric 
acid, both combined and free, because the results 
by Dr. Brighton and by Mr. Harms check very 
closely in this respect, and so far below the other 
determination that I doubt whether this means 
free acid or not. The variation in each case is 
very slight; there is shown by Mr. Harms' analy-
ses a slight lowering of the free acid in the 
Hays water or B. & G. fill water, and in the 
north (Tr. 1998) incline water, but the difference 
is very 'Small, and Dr. Brighton's report shows 
the acidity of the B. & G. drain tunnel water and 
the B. & G. fill water to be the same, so that 
variation is not indicative; might be expected, 
even though they flowed down the same channel. 
The sulphur trioxide total 803, all the re-
sults check very closely and there is very little 
variation in the results on the different samples 
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of water; Black & Deason show less variation 
·between the B. & G. drain tunnel water and the 
B. & G. fill w,ater than does Mr. Harms; Dr. 
Brighton is very close on those two waters, close 
to Mr. Harms; and the two waters are close to 
each other. 
In the silica content of these waters there 
is shown some variation. * * * Comparing 
the B. & G. drain tunnel water with the fill wa-
ter (Tr. 1999) in silica content, Mr. Harms shows 
a very slight variation; Black & Dnason show the 
variation noted on Exhibit No. 68, which was 30 
parts per million. I do not consider that 30 
parts per million in this silica content carries 
any weight as to the source or origin of the 
water or it·s course, because calculated into pounds 
per day, it would only take one pound of silica a 
day to increase that analysis of 4000 gallons of 
water by that amount; I think it perfectly pos-
sible that the waters could absorb such varying 
quantities of silica. 
In the case of iron oxide, all three chemisrts 
show les'S iron oxide in the B. & G. fill water 
than in the B. & G. drain tunnel water, but not 
enough less to indicate a different source to me; 
in each case the difference is slight; they are all 
pretty good checks. 
Aluminum oxide checks very closely in the two 
waters, the B. & U. drain tunnel and the B. & G. 
fill water, and drops down somewhat according 
to Black & Deason's analysis, in the north in-
cline water. * * * 
Coming to the lime, all the chemists agreed 
pretty closely on the lime content of these wa-
ters, each one showing that the B. & G. fill water 
contains a slightly greater amount of lime than 
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the B. & G. drain tunnel water. (Tr. 2000) 
And as I understand with the silica, even with 
this difference in lime showing by Black & Deas-
on that I believe i's something like 70 parts per 
million, which only means about 2.33 pounds of 
lime to be absorbed by 4000 gallons of water per 
day of 24 hours. So that to me that doesn't indi-
cate any more variation, something that you 
might expect from time to time by slightly differ-
ent courses of the water. The magnesia is not a 
very good check as between the chemists, but the 
variation between the different samples of wa-
ter, ~speaking of the first three, is no more in any 
ease and very close in most cases, and show the 
same reading as compared with the chlorine on 
the Black & Deason determination. On the north 
incline the water shows about 70 or 80 parts per 
million more chlorine than the other two waters. 
I have not paid any attention to that difference 
in chlorine because the other chemists do not 
coincide with that increase of chlorine in the 
north incline waters. So with sodium oxide, the 
chemists agree except on the north incline water 
where Mr. Harms shows a great deal larger 
amount of sodium oxide than Black & Deason 
shows and1that determination was not made by Dr. 
Brighton. 
Mr. Harms may be able to explain that in-
crease in sodium oxide in that sample which he 
ran. I won't attempt to do it. So that in every 
case these element's were present in all these 
three waters, the first three waters in subtsan-
tially (Tr. 2001) the same amount and I would 
not expect if that water were from the same 
source, I would not expect any closer check than 
that between chemists. * * * The water from 
the south incline is obviously different. It con-
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tains a comparatively very small amount of total 
solids and practically no copper, not more than 
a trace of free-sulphuric acid and with all the 
other constituents very little in amount, but it is 
obviously from an entirely different source than 
the first three. (Tr. 2002) * * * 
~Most of my time since 1915 has been in the 
metallurgical department except six months' 
period when I was general foreman at the leach-
ing plant of the Utah Copper Company. That 
wws in 1920, from July to December. In the 
course of my employment in the metallurgical de-
partment I have made many analyses of the 
copper waters from the Utah Copper Company's 
various dumps. (Tr. 2004) I have no records of 
analyses of the waters from Dixon Gulch. With 
relation to the waters from the other dumps of 
the Utah Copper Company, I have observed 
generally decided variation from day to day in 
the same water of its various constituents. (Tr. 
2005) * * * 
Those analyses were only run for iron and 
copper. Within a period of 24 hours and some-
times 48 hours these waters show a variation 
of 100 milligrams per liter in copper and iron 
oontent. * * * * 
As to the waters of the B. &. G. drain tun-
nel, the B. &. G. fill and the north incline, from 
the data appearing on Exhibit 77, I should say 
that they are undoubtedly all from the same 
source, they are typical of the waters from the 
Utah Copper dump. * * * (Tr. 2008) 
Cross Examination 
I have not assumed any course for the waters 
m the north incline; I haven't made a study of 
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that part of the situation. I said on the chemical 
analysis of the three waters any chemist after 
having analyzed them would say they were from 
the s~ame ~source, particularly the first two. As 
to whether I would have to have some method 
of ~accounting for some of the variances in order 
to express an opinion with reference to the north 
incline waters,-it would only have to stand in 
contact with rock a little {Tr. 2012) longer than 
the other waters to cause those changes; I don't 
see any very great changes there. The lime 
content of the north incline water would be per-
fectly natur,al if that water had stood practically 
stagnant in contact with material containing lime, 
-almost any rock; lime is present in all water; 
the longer it stands in contact with most any 
rock, although some contain more lime than 
others, the more lime it will pick up. It might 
:be that the lime content in the north incline wa-
ters is greater because of its having stood; or 
it might be if it flowed or happened to flow 
through material containing more lime or flowed 
through slower, so it had a longer contact period. 
I would simply say the lime alone showed some 
'Slight variation, but that all the rest of the ele-
ments there in such similar quantities the lime 
doesn't influence my opinion very much. ( Tr. 
2013) * * * It would take in my opinion a 
very short time to have picked up that much 
lime, particularly since the water is acid and 
calcium carbonate or limestone is very readily 
soluble in dilute acid. (Tr. 2016) * * * The 
solubility of lime is greatly increased due to the 
acid character of the water. This water being of 
the character that it is would be more inclined to 
pick up lime than about anything that it would 
touch. I wouldn't expect it to just about carry 
its burden when it left the Utah Copper dump. 
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(Tr. 2020) Practically all of the lime that exists 
in the Utah Copper area is in the form of silica 
which gMdually goes into solution but not so read-
ily. * * * Those dumps are not homegeneous 
through their entire width and breadth. Rocks 
in the Utah Copper mine vary over wide ranges 
in character as it comes to us at the mills and I 
suppose it does as it goes into the dump. You 
can probably find great variations between one 
point and another in the dump, there is no doubt 
about that. * * * (Tr. 2021) 
Referring to the silica assay here, * • • 
the analyses by all three chemists show an in-
crease in the fill waters in silica, in samples 
taken at various times. I would account for that 
by simply saying that it might gather from the 
fill. ( Tr. 2022) * * * I think the fill could 
readily account for the increase in silica, or pos-
sibly those two waters never did have the same 
silica composition. In my opinion the B. & G. 
fill could easily account for the difference. (Tr. 
2027) You wouldn't have to have any knowledge 
of the character of the fill to express such an 
opinion; all rocks contain silica, whether they run 
from quartzite to porphyry, they are all silicious. 
Some react more readily than others to various 
agencies. That quantity of water with suffieient 
time would dissolve that quantity of silica from 
almost any rock. In my estimation eight hours 
would be sufficient time. It is perfectly obvious, 
when you see that water coming out of rock, that 
it flows at least through and over a great many 
rocks through that fill. (Tr. 2028) * * * I 
think it pussible for me to render a judgment that 
their source is the same, because all those ele-
ments check within reasona;ble limits. (Tr. 2029) 
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Mr. Herman Harms was asked to make a similar 
5tudy and to state his conclusion as to the source of 
those waters. Mr. Harms testified in part as follows: 
Referring to Mr. Martin's exhibit 77, I 
have compared the results here and I might state, 
broadly speaking, that the three analyses made by 
different (Tr. 2032) chemists under unknown 
conditions, with the character of the water in 
que1stion, which was a most unusual one in that 
same contained first an enormous amount of 
solids, and second is of a decided acid character, 
and third contained an unusually large amount of 
copper, iron and alumina, and furthermore the 
iron which is present in both the ferrous and the 
ferric state which is constantly changing the 
composition of the water in question, that the 
result as a whole agrees very s'atisfactorily nota-
bly the actual constituents of the water. (Tr. 
2033) * * * Considering * * * that the 
chemists did not work under identical conditions 
with the same character of apparatus, the amount 
of water taken for the analysis, and furthermore 
the degree of heat applied in drying the residue 
which is known as total solids, I am rather sur-
pri>s~ed that these results on the total solids check 
as closely as they did ~and as reported by the 
three chemists in question. On the other hand it 
will be seen that eliminating the total solids the 
results of these other constituents check very 
satisf'actorily. In fact the copper checks suffi-
ciently close. The sulphuric acid also checks very 
closely with the exception of Black and Deason 
who evidently used an entirely different method 
for obtaining sulphuric acid (Tr. 2034) and evi-
dently calculated their results upon the alkali 
consuming qualities of the water in question, and 
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not the actual free sulphuric acid which, by the 
way again, is a very difficult determination to 
make and subject to a great many errors unless 
made under identical conditions in every way. 
The sulphur trioxide on account of the enormous 
amount present in the water I would say from 
the chemist's standpoint checks very closely. The 
same result I would say from all the * * * 
other ingredients here, a very close check, the 
differences in most instances are due to the 
method of manipulation of the individual chem-
ists. 
The silica I note in the Harms analysis 
here in one instance has increased considerably. 
Now in this particular sample the water was 
cloudy and all of the silica was included that was 
both in solution and suspension, and again I 
consider silica a substance that is insoluble in 
acid. Now another chemist would probably say 
silica is aboslutely 810 2, a substance that 
would be dissolved by alkali and reprecipitated 
by acid. So there again is an opening for diver-
sion of results. The iron oxide, the alumina 
and the lime in my opinion check extremely close-
ly, which is equally true of magnesia, chlorine 
and sodium oxide. (Tr. 2035) * * * 
I might state in fairness to the three chem-
ists in question as well as to the defendant and 
the plaintiff, that from a scientific standpoint 
these analyses should have been carried by the 
three chemists side by side under identical con-
ditions, using the same character of apparatus 
and particularly the same method of analysis. 
Now in a number of these instances different 
me,thods carried out would invariably produce 
different results notably in the character of this 
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water which is subject to all forms of error on 
account of its chamcteristic composition. 
On the other hand there are certain ingredi-
ents (Tr. 2036) here which can be checked up 
closely, not1ably the copper and no doubt in these 
instances the method was identical for the three 
chemists and the results have been that the cop-
per checks extremely close of the three chemists 
in the different samples of water, and as I say 
taking i·t as a whole, broadly speaking, the re-
sults represented here upon this chart by three 
different chemists working unknown to one an-
other, using different methods in analysis that 
the results check extremely satisfactory. The 
solids, if gentle ignition has been used and all of 
the water crystallization been driven off, giving 
just the actual mineral solids as represented by 
the copper and any other individual element 
would pro:bably check extremely close by adding 
these various ingredients. 
'Tiaking up each element by itself and consid-
ering the variation wherever it may appear, if 
any, between the waters of the B. & G. drain tun-
nel, the B. & G. fill and the Prospect Tunnel No. 
2, the north incline, the first three waters in 
the column, those waters show the same similar 
character and in my opinion have percolated 
through ground or rock presenting the same 
general character in its areas. ( Tr. 2037) * • * 
As to the fourth water, the Prospect Tunnel 
No. 1, the south incline, that is entirely differ·ent 
and evidently had traversed through an entirely 
different character of ground than the other two 
samples in question. (Tr. 2038) 
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Cross Examination 
The fourth sample here, this one shows a 
very small amount of solids and practically no 
copper and only a tr'ace of sulphuric acid and a 
relatively small amount of sulphur trioxide; that 
is the south incline water. I regret that I have 
absolutely no knowledge or any information re-
garding the character of the water or the general 
conditions in connection with this case and in fact 
no information has been furnished me whatever, 
merely a request that an analysis be made and 
that was even ordered without particularly speci-
fying the purpose. I have no information or any 
knowledge of anything pertaining to the general 
conditions of the waters in question. (Tr. 2039) 
1Considering the various elements affecting 
the analyses I have mentioned, I say that the 
differences between those waters are not ma-
terial. The total solids, for example, in the par-
ticular I have explained, is no doubt due to the 
water Wat has been retained upon drying. I 
think from a chemist's standpoint, considering the 
sources and character of the water, which is most 
unusual and exceptional, that the results presented 
there check very closely. If I were to assume 
th'at the samples of water were all taken at the 
same time, on the same day, I would certainly 
expect to find those variances by three different 
chemists, particularly when no definite me,thod 
has been sbted, or definite course to be followed 
by different chemists in question. (Tr. 2040) 
* * * 
It is my opm10n this water changes very 
rapidly from day to day, and is never constant; 
every twenty-four hours is certain variation. 
(Tr. 2041) 
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Mr. Martin and Mr. Harms wel'e the only chemists 
called. The defendants' witness Mr. Orane, a mining 
geologist, concluded because of the differ.ence in silica 
content of the solutions from the copper or north in-
cline, as shown by the Harms' analysis, that those water 
must have come from a different source, but the ex-
planation of that result given by Mr. Harms and Mr. 
Martin also, disposed of that conclusion. Mr. Crane 
was not qualified to testify upon that subject. The 
testimony of the chemists, as had the testimony of the 
geologists and engineers upon other subjects, corrobor-
ated the perfectly obvious f,act that the copper solu-
tions in plaintiff's dumps in Dixon Gulch were following 
the course from plaintiff's dumps to plaintiff's intake 
on Tract C the law of gravity compelled, viz., down that 
precipitous gulch, seeping, percolating and flowing 
through the dumps to their present outlet from the drain 
tunnel and through the railroad fill to their present 
outlet in the Hays Spring. 
IV 
Point 
It is absolutely certain that unless the copper solutions 
in plaintiff's dump are actually captured and controlled in the 
dump they will percolate, seep and flow into Tract D. Re-
ply Brief for AppeUants, page 88. 
The .statement cont1ained in the point heading runs 
parallel with the following at page 53 of the Reply Brief 
for Appellants, "We will * * * simply ask this 
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appellate court to disregard these arguments upon dis-
puted facts with reference to the geology and decide 
the questions of law presented by the appeal.'' The 
point heading is followed immediately by this: 
This certainty is a property right in the 
owner of Tract D. This right in the owner of 
Tract D is not an absolute right and may be 
cut off and destroyed by the plaintiff capturing 
,and controlling the solutions before they leave 
the dump. 
It is impossible to reconcile such statements with the 
scores of pages of appelants' briefs devoted to a half-
hearted apologetic denial of the very fact now so posi-
tively asserted. 
So, the defendants have rubandoned their case on the 
facts abandoned their assignment of error as to the 
source of ,the copper solutions, the se1aling of tho westerly 
'Slope of ,the railway fill and its function as a "perfect 
hydraulic dam," admitting that the copper solutions have 
their source in plaintiff's dumps in Dixon Gulch and that 
the course pursued by those solutions was that supplied by 
Dixon Gulch on and above bedrock across Tract D to 
plaintiff's intake in Tract 0, a ,course that is known and 
defined. Defendants have abandoned their assignment of 
error against the finding that all the copper solutions 
flowing at the Hays Spring pursue that known and de-
fined course from that source than which there is none 
other. Defendants have rested their case solely upon 
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their contention upon the law stated at pages 88 and 89 
predicated upon the assertion that defendants had a right 
of some sort to a continued flow of the copper solutions 
from plaintiff's dumps, the artifical product of plain-
tiff's industry and investment, and that if it were im-
possible for plaintiff to erect a barrier on plaintiff's 
property line by which to intercept its solutions at that 
point, then the plaintiff wras without relief, it could not 
pursue its copper solutions, however valuable they might 
be, for defendants by operation of law had become their 
owner, the statutes of Utah affording plaintiff no 
remedy by which to protect and preserve its title to 
this valuable property plaintiff had created. That would 
be a sad commentary upon the Eminent Domain statutes 
of this state framed to aid mining generally as a public 
use under the laws of this state. 
Defendants' stat,ement indicates a surpnsmg con-
ception of legal remedies to be lodged in the minds of 
experienced counsel. To us the dissertation is just so 
much nonsense. Defendants have no property right in 
the continued flow of the copper solutions from plain-
tiff's dumps. There is nothing in that expectancy that 
can be capitalized and sold. Plaintiff is not condemning 
any such expectancy and plaintiff is not "mining the 
defendants' ground.'' Plaintiff never was interested in 
the copper solutions that were upon defendants' prem-
ises before plaintiff received its order for immediate 
occupation on June 13, 1928-those solutions were over 
64 
the wheel. Plaintiff instituted this suit and obtained 
its order for immediate occupation for the purpose of 
t1aking and preserving that part of its copper solutions 
that had not yet reached the defendants' premises and 
that is what plaintiff has done. If an effectual barrier 
could be constructed across Dixon Gulch on plaintiff's 
property line the copper solutions in Tract D would 
cease forthwith. 
At the bottom of page 90 of the Reply Brief for 
Appellants, the defendants inform us that we might 
condemn land for the conduit desired that had not there-
tofore received copper solutions. No one is interested 
in whether or not 'l_lract D had ever received copper 
solutions. Plaintiff's right to condemn does not de-
pend upon whether Tract D be wet or dry. Neither 
plaintiff nor any one else ever was interested in the solu-
tions thlat were molilentarily upon Tract D when the 
order for immediate occupation was signed-there was 
no lake or well upon Tract D the solutions in which 
lake or well plaintiff seized upon the signing of the 
order for immediate occupation. Tmct D never had 
''any water producing capacity,'' a fact defendants not 
only now admit but vigorously assert. It did not take 
long for the copper solutions upon defendants' estate in 
Tract D when the order was signed to pass over and 
from that tract; the solutions yet to come were received 
upon Tract D as upon a tract that had not yet received 
such solutions; that "so far as copper solutions are 
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concerned" it was "barren and non-productive." 
Perhaps it is unfortunate that defendants have suf-
fered the disappointment of being deprived of plaintiff's 
copper solutions defendants had hoped would continue 
to flow upon their property. Had defendants' land 
not theretofore received copper solutions from plain-
tiff's dumps, then apparently, from defendants' discus-
sion, defendants would concede that we had the right to 
condemn becJause defendants would not then have been 
disappointed. Since when has one's disappointment 
been the criterion by which the right to condemn has 
been determined~ The argument is not worthy of reply. 
Such a construction of the Eminent Domain statutes of 
this State by which to continue in plaintiff the right to 
condemn, upon the facts of this case, that its title and 
ownership might rbe protected and preserved in the 
valuable property plaintiff has created, would be with-
out precedent in the conduct of judiciral functions any-
where, would shock the conscience of all who might 
become cognizant of such a decision, while from the 
point of view of its soundness in law would be incon-
sistent, illogical, ridiculous and absurd. Defendants' 
argument merits no other characterization. 
There is constantly repeated throughout appellants' 
brief a statement that copper solutions and waters were 
present upon Tract D before plaintiff's dumps in Dixon 
Gulch were begun in 1926. We discussed a similar state-
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ment, in respondent's brief under Point 3 at pages 59 
to 64, and generally under Point A at pages 14 to 64. 
Of course the rain falls and the snows collect upon the 
railway fill and the trial court so found with unusual 
meticulosity by its Finding No. XXXI (Abs. 620). How-
ever, the defendants are not interested in the meteoric 
waters that fall upon the railway fill, nor are they in-
terested in the copper solutions as waters-the defend-
ants are not interested in wa,ter at all, they have said so 
time and again, so why harp upon the presence of waters 
in Dixon Gulch bfore the construction there of plaintiff's 
dumps or the presence of the trace of copper in the wa-
ters placed there by the mine waste and overburden 
dumped into Dixon Gulch in the construction of the rail-
way fill7 The only apparent purpose is the remote 
possibility that some confusion will be thus created in 
the mind of the court th'at in some way will result favor-
ably to defendants' contention. Or perhaps, like coun-
sel's inquiry into the relationship, if any, between 
plaintiff and the Bingham and Garfield Railway Com-
pany, this is another manifestation of counsel's sense of 
humor. 
v 
Point 
City of Los Angeles v. Pomeroy, 124 Cal. 597, 57 Pac. 585. 
Pages 75 to 79 of the Reply Brief for Appellants 
IS devoted to a discussion of the above case, wherein 
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especial emphasis is placed upon the ruling of the court 
that the owner of the land taken should be compensated 
for such market value as it might possess by reason of 
percolating waters within it not tributary to the natural 
stream, counsel discussing that feature of the decision 
as though it were an aid to their contention in the case 
at bar. The Supreme Court of California held in that 
case that the right of the City of Los Angeles in and to 
the waters of the natural stream was paramount to the 
riparian and all other rights of others upon the natural 
stream and that the value of the land taken was subject 
to this right of the City of Los Angeles. (57 Pac. 593). 
The City of Los Angeles did not condemn the right it 
already possessed and the value of that right was not 
properly an element of value in the land condemned. 
The court further held that if the City of Los Angeles 
in order to supply its inhabitants with water found, 
* * * itself compelled to encroach upon the 
riparian rights of laud owners along the river 
it ought to pay for those rights, the same as for 
any other private property taken for a public 
use. (57 Pac. 600). 
and again at page 602: 
* * * The point for the jury to determine was 
the value given to these lands by percolating 
waters not a part of the stream,-waters which 
the owners of the land bad a right to convey to 
a distance for sale. 
The Court expressing the opinion that, 
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* * * aside from the water flowing in the sub-
terranean portion of the stream, as defined by 
the instructions, there is no evidence to prove the 
existence of any considerable quantity of perco-
lating water in the tract condemned, * * * 
and, since only a very small portion of the 315-
acre tract is higher than the bed of the stream, 
the percolating waters which they could drain 
without interference with the stream would be 
too inconsiderable in amount, and their right too 
precarious, to add materially to the value of the 
land. (57 Pac. 592) 
The City sought to condemn the fee in 315 acres 
of land in the course of a subterranean stream, which 
acreage the City required for the construction of its 
collection and diversion facilities. Is there anything 
unusual in that the percolating waters in the land con-
demned not tributary to the natural stream were to be 
considered as a part of the land and to be paid for as 
such? The court could hardly have held otherwise. 
We cited the case in part for its definition of a 
natural stream (Respondent's Brief, pages 82 to 86), 
concluding that within that definition the copper solu-
tions in Dixon Gulch flowed along a course known and 
defined and, if water, then as a natural stream. We fail 
to understand how the California decision can have any 
further relevancy to the issue before this court in the 
case at bar. By the suit at bar plaintiff seeks to con-
demn merely an easement or right of way over and across 
Tract D for the conve)'lance of its copper solutions, arti-
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ficially produced by it in its dumps or deposits made 
at higher elevations in Dixon Gulch. Plaintiff does not 
seek to condemn the fee, nor to take anything whatever 
out of defendants' land. Tract D condemned has no 
capacity for the production of copper solutions, and cop-
per solutions only, constitute the subject matter of 
the present controversy. Were it not for plaintiff's 
industry and investment Tract D would be barren 
of any copper solutions. That fact was found by the 
court below and is overwhelmingly sustained by the 
evidence. The City of Los Angeles in the case dis-
cussed was not required to pay for the water of the 
natural stream. Its interest therein was paramount to 
the riparian right of the land condemned. Of course 
the City of Los Angeles was not required to pay for 
percolating waters within the land condemned that were 
tri1butary to the natural stream. 
What a travesty upon the law it would be in the 
case at bar were defendants' contention to prevail and 
the plaintiff be required to pay a second time for the 
copper solutions i,t had once artificially produced by 
its effort, industry and expenditure, simply because 
those solutions of necessity flow down a precipitous 
gulch over a channel otherwise barren of such solutions, 
over which channel plaintiff had condemned an ease-
ment for their transportation to its intake, upon the 
value of which easement the parties had agreed and the 
purchase price for which easement had been paid 
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into court and the final order of condemnation made and 
entered, the only remaining point at issue being that 
these defendants insist that they should be paid in ad-
dition the value of the copper solutions the plaintiff 
had produced as the result of plaintiff',s great expendi-
ture and investment already made. Is it any wonder 
that one's difficulty lay in comprehending defendants' 
contention and that such contention cannot be otherwise 
characterized than as ridiculous and absurd in law. 
VI 
Point 
Dried Up Water 
At page 21 of the Reply Brief for Appellants, we 
are informed that there is no evidence that the little 
pools of copper solutions dried up, that the statement 
is wholly unsupported by the evidence and we are asked 
to "produce any evidence sustaining such statement." 
The Hays lower cut was a cut made by the defend-
ants across the outcrop of the porpryry dike below the 
sulphide ledge or vein and below the copper and fresh 
water inclines. Copper solutions collected in the Hays 
lower cut, and the defendants urged this as an independ-
ent source of supply. Concerning the Hays lower cut 
Mr. Hanson testified in part as follows: 
I have not observed a seepage or percola-
tion of water anywhere within this porphyry dike; 
(Tr. 2806) * * * 
71 
I have seen the Hays lower cut with copper 
water in it and I have seen it dry and I have 
seen it with what appeared to me to be fresh 
water. Last fall I observed the Hays lower cut 
to contain copper water. This spring I was up 
Dixon Gulch the day after-I wouldn't say de-
finitely the date, but within a day or so after 
the two inclines had been siphoned out, and at 
that time the Hays lower cut was dry, containing 
nothing but mud and dry mud at that in the bot-
tom of it. 
A few days after that I was in Dixon Gulch 
again and at that time the Utah Copper Company 
had been bailing out the fresh water incline with 
buckets so as to enable us to get into the bottom 
and at that particular time the copper water 
incline was not filled up ,sufficiently to require 
bailing and at that time my observation was that 
the water in the Hays lower cuts was practically 
fresh water. (Tr. 2807) 
You could see the trench down the hillside 
in the surface wash from the two inclines where 
they had been drained out and bucketed out; two 
trenches came down the side of the hill, con-
verged down here on the porphyry dike and the 
flow was in a northeasterly direction along the 
porphyry dike into the Hays lower cut, and the 
direction of that flow was very apparent at that 
time. My conclusion was that the water was de-
rived from surface seepage from the two inclines. 
(Tr. 2808). 
There were in addition two cuts made along the 
sulphide vein north of the copper water incline and con-
cerning them Mr. Earl testified as follows (Tr. 2158): 
I recall two cuts along that sulphide vein 
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* * * I sa,w them when they were working 
on them :and I saw them since. The cut that 
was there last fall is just north of the copper 
water incline. When the copper water incline 
was siphoned out, that cut dried up. I believe, 
my recollection right now is, that it dried up 
before the copper incline was siphoned out; it 
was dried up after the copper incline was opened 
up and before it was siphoned out. (Tr. 2158) 
* * * 
There is no water making in the cut that 
has been more recently made, the one still farther 
to the north on 'the sulphide vein, north of the 
north incline. (Tr. 2160) 
Concerning the Hays lower cut, Mr. Marsh testified 
as follows (Tr. 2863): 
I have observed water in the Hays lower 
cut below the quartize ledge. The quantity of that 
water is very small, I should say not more than 
four gallons a day. I have made several obser-
vations and study in regard to the source of that 
water. My conclusion is that the water in the 
Hays lower cut, which has been marked in the 
square in blue with dashes on it on exhibit 104 
(Tr. 2863) has its origin or source from the fresh 
water incline and also from the copper incline 
at times when there is an overflow in the drain 
tunnel, it would have a source from there also. 
Those waters flow directly over the quartzite 
ledge down the slope until they pass directly over 
the porphyry dyke and where the sulphide fissure 
is located in the porphyry dyke there would be a 
certain amount of these waters find their way and 
percolate and pass downward and intercept the 
Hays lower cut. 
I have observed this Hays lower cut to be 
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dry. On June 2rrd of this year both the fresh 
water incline and the copper incline were siphoned 
out and about two days after that the Hays 
lower cut dried completely up. That was ,simply 
due to siphoning these waters out and when there 
was no more water to cause an overflow why sim-
ply the cut dried up. (Tr. 2864) 
With relation to the Hays cut on the sulphide vein 
just north of the copper water incline, Mr. Beeson testi-
fied (Tr. 2653): 
Q. What was the point marked 34? 
A. That is the open cut which is just to the 
north of the copper incline. The water in that 
particular cut was coming from the copper in-
cline because they are both right there together. 
* * * We found the water in the open cut 
ceased to run when the incline was drained. 
Concerning the copper and fresh water inclines and 
the Hays lower cut, Mr. Beeson testified (Tr. 2657-58): 
Later on those copper waters from the Rail-
way drain tunnel had been sealed off and pre-
vented from percolating down along these sur-
face cracks and coming in along the top of this 
copper incline and the fact that the copper 
content decreased shortly after the waters were 
diverted would indicate that there is no ques-
tion but wbat the copper content of the waters 
in the copper incline was due to seepage or leak-
ing of this water from the B and G drain tunnel 
and from the pipe which conducted those waters 
down to the intake on r:L'ract C. The fresh water 
incline filled up shortly after that with the same 
character of water as was there formerly which 
was fresh water, so that I would say from those 
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~two observations that the water coming from 
along the sulphide vein or from these three or 
four observations was from fresh water except 
where it had received its copper content from the 
waters of the Band G drain tunnel. 
Q. What became of the water in the Hays 
lower cut? 
A. I don't believe that I noticed a great dif-
ference in the water because it was apparently 
fed from the leaking or running of the water ap-
pearing on the sulphide vein and from leaks 
in the pipe line where it derived its copper con-
tent, and the salt experiment also showed there 
was a slight increase in the sodium chloride in 
the water in the Hays cut so that I would decide 
that got its copper content from the same source. 
The copper water incline did not dry up but its 
waters lost their copper content in a degree commensur-
ate with the effectiveness with which had been accomp-
lished the sealing off of the railway drain tunnel waters. 
(Plaintiff's Exhibits 103, 111, 112, 114, Tr. 2153, 2941 
to 2977, 3007). The flow of water from the north or 
copper incline was so small it was collected in an eight 
ounce bottle and it took two minutes thirty-three seconds 
to fill that eight ounce bottle, that being at the rate of 
thirty-five gallons in twenty-four hours. (Tr. 2153). 
After the wa~ter had been siphoned out of the copper 
water incline a sample was taken from a pool that had 
collected in the bottom of the incline and the analysis 
of that sample (Ex. 86) ran 0.91 pounds per thousand 
gallons (Tr. 2155). 
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VII 
Point 
"At first, plaintiff's witnesses testified that these waters 
passed through the French drain, but a reading of the evi-
dence of Mr. Beeson showed that that was completely aban-
doned." Reply Brief for Appellants, page 38. "They com-
pletely destroyed and filled up to the so-called French drain 
which plaintiff at first relied upon for the passage of these 
waters through the railroad fill, and they did it so effectually 
and so completely that counsel for plaintiff finally, in open 
court, announced the abandonment of such an idea, and it 
was never heard of again." Reply Brief for Appellants, page 40. 
Counsel know better than the above and that the 
court may understand that Mr. Beeson's testimony is 
not susceptible to such interpretation and that plaintiff 
rat no time altered or abandoned its contention as to the 
porosity of the westerly slope of the railway fill and 
its French drain construction, let us observe Mr. Bee-
son's 'testimony as follows: 
Tt is just as reasonable as it possibly can 
be the water would percolate down through that 
fill (Tr. 2666) behind the Band G track * * * 
I was present when that water was placed on the 
B and G fill 1and I observed the measurements 
also that were taken down at point 60 and at 
point 58, 60 being the position that the waters 
come out from under the fill which has been call-
ed the Hays Spring and 58 is the portal of the 
B and G drain 'tunnel. 
When the water was applied at point 61 
sometime 1ater, there was a considerable increase 
in the flow at the point 60, indicating that the 
waters had passed down through this B and G 
fill into the bottom of the gulch and passed right 
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on down that channel, coming out at 60. A later 
experiment was made by placing water at the 
point which I will mark as 63 also indiC'ated by 
a figure 2 on this map. The waters placed on 
the D dump at that position flowed down through 
the dump and encountered the natural surface of 
the side hill and part ·Of the water flowed down 
through the bottom of the gulch and percolated 
down through the fill, going on down and came 
out at the point 60 or the position called the 
Hays Spring. I would say in the former experi-
ment there was no change in the water coming 
through the B and G drain tunnel and in this 
experiment ,there was an increase in the water 
passing under the fill (Tr. 2667) and also in the 
water passing through the drain tunnel, which 
was directly due to the application of the water 
at the point 63. A later experiment was per-
formed-In all ,these experiments the water ap-
plied there was fresh water. I believe the cop-
per content went up considerably when the water 
was applied because it was flushing out the cop-
per minerals which had accumulated in the dump, 
and then water was applied at a point marked 
64. This water apparently flowed down to the 
bottom of the gulch and made an increase at the 
point 60 where it came out from under the B and G 
fill at the position called the Hays Spring. On 
the last experiment there was no increase in the 
water of the B and G drain tunnel because those 
waters apparently reached the bottom of the 
gulch and passed through there and found an 
easy enough channel to pass through that rail-
road fill without increasing the flow from that 
drain tunnel. (Tr. 2668) * * * 
* * * I have found no evidence here 
which indicates 'that any of that copper water is 
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coming down and mingling with those fresh wa-
ters * * * But on the other hand, the copper 
water coming out of the so-called Hays Spring 
is almost identical with the copper water coming 
out of the portal of the B and G drain tunnel, so 
I assume that they have a common source in 
this dump. 
If they had passed down through rocks and 
come out, they would certainly mingle with fresh 
waters, and there would be a very considerable 
difference in the copper content. 
Summarizing, from my testimony, it is my 
opinion that no part of the water appearing 
through the railroad fill at the point the de-
fendants have indicated as the Hays ,Spring has 
found its way beneath the surface of bed rock. 
(Tr. 2671). 
And with relation to the four demonstrations of 
the porosity of the westerly slope of the railway fill, 
Mr. Marsh testified: 
During the fall of 1928 we performed several 
experiments by putting water back of this so-
called impervious dam and in each instance it 
was very conclusive to me that that water passed 
through this so-called impervious dam, and either 
came out through the B and G drain tunnel or out 
through the so-called Hays Spring. Those ex-
periments were very conclusive, and proved to 
me without a doubt that the B and G fill there 
was not impervious at all, but was rather porous, 
and would permit any water which was placed 
in any way, by nature or artificially, back of this 
west slope, that it would pass through the fill 
and enter at a point either through the B and G 
drain tunnel or at the so-called Hays Spring. 
(Tr. 3017) 
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And Mr. Earl testified upon this subject in part 
as follows: 
From my observation of fills similarly con-
structed with all these characteristics of drain-
age areas above them and all my experience, as 
to the length of time that would be required to 
render any portion of the west slope of the B 
and G railroad fill in Dixon Gulch impervious to 
the passage, seepage and percolation of water 
through it-I don't think that the fill in Dixon 
Gulch would ever become impervious. The wa-
ter conditions continuing as they have in the 
past during my observation, the water would con-
tinue to flow through that fill in much greater 
quantities than ever has been known to come out 
of the so-called Hays Spring. (Tr. 2211) 
We acknowledge counsel's discovery of an error on 
page 43 of Respondent's Brief in our description of 
Experiment No. 2 in that the flow there stated as from 
' 
the Hays Spring was in fact from the B. & G. Railway 
drain tunnel, while the flow there stated as from the 
drain tunnel wa.s in fact from the Hays Spring, all of 
which clearly appears upon the several references fur-
nished for the statement. 'The proof of the porosity 
of the railway fill is, of course, equally convincing as 
stated with the correction. The purpose ·of the experi-
ments was convincingly accomplished in the words of 
Mr. Marsh (Tr. 1452), "Simply to prove our own ideas; 
we alway,s knew that there was water going through 
the B. & G. fill, but to prove beyond a doubt this demon-
stration was made." 
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VIII 
Point 
"What is a Ditch." Reply Brief for Appe1Iants, pages 93 
to 96. 
Apparently counsel's idea of a water course, a de-
fined channel, a natural stream, ditch, outlet, drain, etc., 
is a channel that is free from any obstruction or im-
pediment whatever along which courses water in a 
single undivided and unobstructed mass. Counsel heart-
ily approve of Los Angeles v. Pomeroy, 124 Cal. 597, 
57 Pac. 585, and they should not have overlooked the 
clear definition of a natural stream or water course 
therein contained and universally accepted. (Respond-
ent's Brief, pages 83 and 84). The underground water 
course, by that decision defined as a natural stream, 
flowed at the rate of only 14 to 17 miles per annum. 
Its greatest width was 12 miles and its narrowest part 
from 2000 feet to 3 miles and the water constituting 
that natural stream filled the voids or interstices of an 
''alluvial or other deposit made up of loam, sand, gravel 
and boulders, mixed together and interspersed with 
broken or irregular strata or masses of clay or cemented 
sand and gravel." In the case at bar the narrow chan-
nel is defined by the walls of Dixon Gulch. In the 
Pomeroy case the course was defined by two parallel 
ranges of hills miles part. If in the case at bar the 
copper solutions be water, they certainly flow down a 
known and defined course or channel and constitute a 
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natural stream, whatever may be the law with relation 
to their appropriation. 
IX 
Point 
Costs 
We quote from the reply brief for appellants at 
page 104 as follows: 
On page 123 plaintiff says: ''The costs taxed 
were not incurred in ascertaining the amount of 
the compensation to which the owner was en-
titled by reason of the taking;'' etc. rrrue. The 
main question in this case is whether or not the 
plaintiff is by this action taking the defendants' 
copper solutions. The land itself without the 
solutions is of comparatively little value. 
"The land itself without the solutions" is all the 
plaintiff can and all it seeks to take by this action. 
Plaintiff already has the solutions. Defendants have 
none to give. We think the authorities cited in re-
spondent's brief make it very clear that the issue as to 
who owns the solutions had no proper place in this con-
demnation suit. Plaintiff did not object to the trial 
of that issue here. It was agreeruble to plaintiff that 
that issue be so determined and the parties are bound 
by the result, but when it comes to the taxation of costs, 
the trial of that issue has nothing whatever to do with 
the constitutional provision against the taking of private 
property for public use without just compensation. There 
is nothing in the constitutional provision to permit a 
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defendant in a condemnation suit to try issues of title 
to property not sought to be condemned with the cer-
tainty that all costs incurred therein shall be paid by the 
condemner, however frivolous may be the defendant's 
claim and unsuccessful the defendant's effort. Costs 
go as of course to the successful party in the trial of 
such issues. The constitutional provision serves to in-
sure fair compensation to the landowner for the land 
taken, 'but in the case at bar the parties stipulated upon 
that amount and the sum so stipulated was paid into 
court. That issue of value of the tract taken, as counsel 
admit, was not the subject of this law suit for the "land 
itself is of comparative little value." It is, of course, 
only because of the constitutional provision referred to 
that the rule has arisen in condemnation suits, wherein 
the real and ultimate issue is of the value of the tract 
taken and damages to the balance of the larger tract 
by reason of the taking, that the costs so incurred must 
be paid by the condemner. To the suit at bar the con-
stitutional provision does not apply, because the only 
issue with which the constitutional provision is con-
cerned was in fact never in the case. No testimony was 
taken and no costs incurred with relation to it. 
Were the question of title tried in the suit at 
bar one relating to the tract condemned, Section 7338, 
Compiled Laws of Utah, 1917, would, of course, apply, 
for by that section courts are given power in a con-
demnation suit "to hear and determine all adverse or 
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conflicting claims to the property sought to be con-
demned." In the case at bar no copper solutions are 
''sought to be condemned.'' In the case at bar no cop-
per solutions have been nor could be condemned. 
Were the plaintiff seeking to condemn through the 
defendants' property a right of way for the construction 
and operation of a tunnel to f,acilitate the mining of 
ground within the vertical boundaries of plaintiff's lode 
claims, the defendants might with equal propriety plead 
as a defense to the condemnation suit that the de-
fendants were the owners of the apex of the lode plain-
tiff was seeking to mine. If such a defense were to be 
allowed the parties would be forthwith plunged into an 
apex suit, wherein the plaintiff condemner, upon the 
theory of the defendants in the suit at bar, would be 
required to pay the costs, although entirely successful 
in the apex litigation and even though the trial of those 
issues had consumed months of time and thousands of 
pages of testimony. In such a suit the right to condemn 
would be no clearer than in the case ~at bar, both being 
as clear as could well be imagined upon any conceivable 
set of facts. In the case suggeS'ted as well as in the 
suit at bar the damages to be recovered for the property 
taken would be nominal merely, the only thing of value 
being the ore body, which was, of course, not being con-
demned, no more than are the copper solutions in the 
case at bar. If any court has held that a simple con-
demnation suit of relatively little or no importance can 
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be so converted into an apex suit, a suit to quiet title to 
an ore body of great value, as intricate, complex, pro-
longed and costly as such suits usually are, and the 
plaintiff condemner be required to pay the costs in any 
event, we would like very much to be advised of any 
authority upon which such a ruling could be justified. 
That would be stretching the constitutional provision 
with a vengeance, but no more so than the defendants 
would have this court do in the oase at bar. Of course 
such a defense should be denied in a condemnation suit 
and the defendants in such suit be relegated to an action 
to quiet title and for injunotive relief. The condemna-
tion suit should be preserved as such. If the condemn-
ing party should find he had no ore body to mine he 
would have acquired an easement to no purpose; like-
wise in the case at bar should plaintiff discover that 
it had no title to the dumps in Dixon Gulch, from which 
plaintiff is producing the copper solutions in question, 
plaintiff would by the case at bar have acquired an 
easement to no purpose, but defendants admit that they 
could not for that reason have injected into this case a 
defense predicated upon plaintiff's lack of title to its 
dumps. 
It is only by reason of the constitutional pro-
vision and the fact that if applicable it transcends the 
statute that defendants can find anything upon which 
to predicate an argument upon this point. But neither 
the constitutional prov1s10n nor defendants' right to 
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costs is broadened at all by plain tiff's consent to the 
trial in this condemnation suit of the defendants' claim 
of title. Plaintiff is not now and never was interested 
in any copper solutions upon the defendants' premises. 
Plaintiff knows there are no copper solutions upon de-
fendants' premises. Plaintiff has been always and is 
now interested only in the copper solutions it has been 
producing and is now producing upon its own premises. 
Plaintiff knows and has proved in this case that the cop-
per solutions it has produced and is now producing upon 
its own premises are the only copper solutions about 
which this controversy is being waged. Plaintiff does 
not by this action seek to condemn copper solutions of 
any sort and plaintiff cannot by this action condemn any 
such. The authorities cited by defendants upon this 
point are foreign to the is·sue. 
The proceeding in eminent domain is a creature 
of the statute and the power of the court in such 
proceeding is defined and limited by the statute ac-
cordingly. We, therefore, look to Section 7338, Com-
piled Laws of Utah, 19U, for that definition as follows: 
'The court or judge thereof shall have power : 
1. To determine the conditions specified in 
§ 7333; to determine the places of making con-
nections and crossings, ~and to regulate the man-
ner thereof and of enjoying the common use men-
tioned in sub. 5, § 7332; 
2. To hear and determine all adverse or con-
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flicting claims to the property sought to be 
condemned, and to the damages therefor; 
3. To determine the respective rights of 
different parties seeking condemnation of the 
same property. 
,The conditions specified in Sec. 7333 are the fol-
lowing: 
Before property can be taken it must appear; 
1. That the use to which it is to be applied 
is a use authorized by law; 
2. That the taking is necessary to such use; 
3. If already appropriated to some public 
use that the public use to which it is to be ap-
plied is a more necessary public use. 
Counsel seize upon the fir1st "that the use to which 
it (the property condemned) is to be applied is a use 
authorized by law'' as the basis of the defendant's 
contention. 
The conclusion upon the issue of ownership of the 
copper solutions is not determinative of the question 
a1s to whether or not the property taken is to be applied 
to a use authorized by law. Whether or not the use is 
a public use, is to be ascertained by an inspection of 
the complaint, wherein it is alleged that the use is to be 
the conveyance of copper solutions from dumps above 
in Dixon Gulch, over Tract D to the intake on Tract C. 
After devoting some months to the trial of a suit to 
quiet title to the copper solutions flowing across Tract 
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D, the court by its findings on that issue in plaintiff's 
favor was assisted not at all to a conclusion as to 
whether or not the use to which the property was to be 
applied was a use authorized by law. 
Had this sui·t proceeded in the orthodox fashion 
of a condemnation suit and plaintiff had taken its judg-
ment and final order of condemnation and then been 
una!ble to establish title to the copper solutions, for the 
conveyance of which it had acquired the easement con-
demned, plaintiff might have found itself with an ease-
ment for which it had no use, although, nevertheless, 
the use to which the land condemned was to have been 
applied was a use authorized by law and thereby the 
statutory provisions had been fully complied with. 
Plaintiff could not have devoted the easement to any 
other use. It might not have been used at all, but the 
defendants would not have been injured in tha·t event, 
and neither the courts nor litigants in such proceedings 
are required to devote months to the trial of collateral 
issues positively to determine in advance that there will 
be no hitch in the condemner's carrying out its intended 
purpose fully and completely. It has been decided many 
times tliat it is no defense to a condemnation suit that 
the condemner has no funds with which to pay for the 
land taken, or that a municipality, for instance, would 
thereby incur an indebtedness in excess of its debt 
limit, or that no appropriation had been made whereby 
to defray the expense of the project, or that the proper 
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antecedent steps had been taken upon which to provide 
requisite tax levies whereby to finance the project, or 
that the sum provided was inadequate and the source of 
the funds with which a city pays for lands condemned 
is of no concern to the landowner. 20 C. J. 909, § 327. 
It must be obvious to all that whether or not plaintiff 
could maintain its condemnation suit did not depend 
upon plaintiff's ownership of any property at all. The 
landowner's protection lay in the necessity that plaintiff 
pay for what it takes and the condemner is not apt to 
pay for something for which it will have no use. Ac-
cordingly it has been held that a public service com-
pany may exerci,se the power of eminent domain before 
performing any public service. Deseret Water, Oil 
& Irrigation Go. v. State, 167 Cal. 147, 138 Pac. 981. 
The exercise of the power of eminent domain may be 
the first step toward the acquisition of property in the 
condemner's performance of a public service. 
Whether or not the use to which the land taken was 
to be applied was a use authorized by law was determin-
ed by an inspection of the complaint and not by an in-
quiry into what, if any, property plaintiff then owned. 
The lengthy, exhaustive and expensive trial of defend-
ants' claim of tide to the copper solutions was nothing 
other than a title suit that had been injected into this 
condemnation proceeding by defendants because no 
one objected, and costs to be awarded therein should be 
upon rules applic-able to such causes. The conS'titu-
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tional provision, of course, has nothing to do with the 
question. 
X 
Point 
The Form of the Judgment 
In the coul"se of the oral argument defendants' 
counsel ridiculed the following provision in the judg-
ment (Abs. 673) and final order of condemnation (Ahs. 
683): 
* * * that, before any material shall be 
dumped upon said tracts, or any of them, or 
any other or different use be made thereof, said 
defendant Stephen Hays Estate, Inc., shall have 
given plaintiff thirty days' notice in writing of 
such intention, and of the character of the use to 
which said premises shall be so subjected, and 
thereupon plaintiff shall have the right and priv-
ilege at plaintiff's expense of relocating and re-
collJstructing plain tiff's f acili ties affected thereby 
to and upon such other unoccupied tracts of land, 
if any there may be, owned by defendants, or any 
of them, from which no interference shall result 
with the said operations of said defendant Stephen 
Hays Estate, Inc. 
The form of that judgment and final order of con-
demn'ation was stipulated (Abs. 651), a fact counsel 
did not explain. The defendants assigned no error 
with relation to that or any other feature of the judg-
ment, the error assigned being merely that a judgment 
had been made and entered against defendants. In 
view of the stipulation it ill becomes counsel to point 
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with ridicule to the very provision for which they ex-
pressly stipulated. 
Conclusion 
There is no error in the record. The findings are 
supported by the evidence and the judgment below should 
be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
DICKSON, ELLis, PARSONs & McCREA. 
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